Approval is not session binding in identity-provider-mediated push authentication
National-scale digital identity systems increasingly use push-based authentication across multiple relying parties. This study examines single sign-on–style, identity-provider-mediated push authentication, in which a relying party delegates authentication to an external identity provider and the user approves a request on a registered device. Using Nafath, Saudi Arabia’s national authentication platform, we introduce a channel-separated assessment framework that distinguishes approval/assertion security from session establishment. We analyzed 1,782 valid Select-and-Confirm notifications from 1,820 controlled captures. The results showed high entropy, balanced option placement, and slight exact-value deviation from uniformity, but no tested offline prediction model met a predefined improvement over baseline attacker strategies. We then conducted a two-phase controlled reverse-proxy relay assessment using researcher-controlled accounts and devices. In Phase 1, approval of a current request number enabled attacker-side session establishment when post-approval artifacts were transferable across browser environments. In a later post-disclosure reassessment, Phase 2 no longer reproduced cross-browser artifact transfer, and approval notifications displayed additional requester and context information; the internal cause could not be determined. These findings show that identifier-based initiation, approval context, and session binding are distinct security problems. Number matching should therefore be combined with origin-bound or sender-constrained mechanisms, including WebAuthn/passkeys, OAuth 2.0 mutual TLS, and DPoP.
Authors
- Mohammed Jubur (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9398-3875)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Scientific Reports
- Published
- 2026-11-19
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-026-80625-8
- Primary Topic
- User Authentication and Security Systems
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00