Millikan, Persistence, and Direct Proper Functions: A Slippery Rockslide?

This paper argues that Ruth Millikan’s official definitions in Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories admit persistence-based direct proper functions. These definitions do not require reproductions to involve numerically distinct persisting items, thus supporting a broader account than her surrounding prose suggests. I demonstrate how this interpretation extends through Millikan’s first-order machinery and into her definition of direct proper function. Accordingly, direct proper functions can be conferred on synapses via synapse selection and, more implausibly, on rocks via rockfalls. I examine three strategies for blocking this result: a reproduction requirement, a population requirement, and a service requirement. Given Millikan’s explanatory aims, I argue that she should reject these as general requirements, but accept them for theoretically important subclasses.

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Analysis
Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anag087
Primary Topic
Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
Type
article
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article

Millikan, Persistence, and Direct Proper Functions: A Slippery Rockslide?

Fabian Hundertmark
Analysis
Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
article

Millikan, Persistence, and Direct Proper Functions: A Slippery Rockslide?

Fabian Hundertmark
article en

Abstract

This paper argues that Ruth Millikan’s official definitions in Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories admit persistence-based direct proper functions. These definitions do not require reproductions to involve numerically distinct persisting items, thus supporting a broader account than her surrounding prose suggests. I demonstrate how this interpretation extends through Millikan’s first-order machinery and into her definition of direct proper function. Accordingly, direct proper functions can be conferred on synapses via synapse selection and, more implausibly, on rocks via rockfalls. I examine three strategies for blocking this result: a reproduction requirement, a population requirement, and a service requirement. Given Millikan’s explanatory aims, I argue that she should reject these as general requirements, but accept them for theoretically important subclasses.

Analysis
Universitat de València (ES)
Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
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