Paying for Behaviour, Not for RightsAn Open-Enrolment, Behaviour-Contingent Incentive Mechanism for Live-Streaming Broadcasters

Conventional broadcaster programmes on live-streaming platforms pay for rights: an up-front or periodic exclusivity payment is exchanged for a contractual commitment to minimum hours or exclusive presence. Such programmes carry three structural costs — legal overhead, adverse selection (payment precedes performance), and a retention cliff at contract expiry. This paper proposes and formalises an alternative mechanism that pays only for measured behaviour already delivered: enrolment is open (no contract), a reward is unlocked by a strictly defined qualified stream-day, and the reward is scaled by a streak multiplier that increases with unbroken consecutive participation. The mechanism is described in full, its expected cost behaviour is analysed, and six falsifiable propositions are stated for empirical test. No quantitative claim in this paper has been tested; the document is explicitly a design proposal and declares its own limitations.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24359568
Primary Topic
Digital Platforms and Economics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Paying for Behaviour, Not for RightsAn Open-Enrolment, Behaviour-Contingent Incentive Mechanism for Live-Streaming Broadcasters

湖南耒阳 曾乐
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Digital Platforms and Economics
article

Paying for Behaviour, Not for RightsAn Open-Enrolment, Behaviour-Contingent Incentive Mechanism for Live-Streaming Broadcasters

湖南耒阳 曾乐
article en

Abstract

Conventional broadcaster programmes on live-streaming platforms pay for rights: an up-front or periodic exclusivity payment is exchanged for a contractual commitment to minimum hours or exclusive presence. Such programmes carry three structural costs — legal overhead, adverse selection (payment precedes performance), and a retention cliff at contract expiry. This paper proposes and formalises an alternative mechanism that pays only for measured behaviour already delivered: enrolment is open (no contract), a reward is unlocked by a strictly defined qualified stream-day, and the reward is scaled by a streak multiplier that increases with unbroken consecutive participation. The mechanism is described in full, its expected cost behaviour is analysed, and six falsifiable propositions are stated for empirical test. No quantitative claim in this paper has been tested; the document is explicitly a design proposal and declares its own limitations.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Digital Platforms and Economics
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