For Whom Is Death Bad? A Relational Subsequentism

If the person who dies ceases to exist, attributing to them a harm that postdates their death seems to require a harm without a subject. This article argues that the difficulty comes from misidentifying the bearer of death’s harm. With respect to the deceased, it grants Epicurus that death is not bad for them. It argues further that the intuitions that motivate deprivationism track a real harm whose bearer is the survivor, considered in their relational dimension. Death forecloses the real relation the survivor had with the deceased and leaves only an intentional one. What is bad about this is the foreclosure of the relationship’s valued possibilities, a loss made true by present traces of the bond and by the survivor’s attachment to the relationship. Unlike deprivationism, the account requires no determinate fact about what would have happened. The result is a relational subsequentism, in which the harm begins with the death, lasts as long as the bond, and is suffered episodically. The account explains why death differs from other separations, why dying young seems worse than dying old, and why prenatal nonexistence is not bad in the same way. Its specificity depends on the Termination Thesis.

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Publication Details

Journal
Research Square
Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11342076/v1
Primary Topic
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Type
preprint
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For Whom Is Death Bad? A Relational Subsequentism

Rodrigo Laera
Research Square
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
preprint

For Whom Is Death Bad? A Relational Subsequentism

Rodrigo Laera
preprint en

Abstract

If the person who dies ceases to exist, attributing to them a harm that postdates their death seems to require a harm without a subject. This article argues that the difficulty comes from misidentifying the bearer of death’s harm. With respect to the deceased, it grants Epicurus that death is not bad for them. It argues further that the intuitions that motivate deprivationism track a real harm whose bearer is the survivor, considered in their relational dimension. Death forecloses the real relation the survivor had with the deceased and leaves only an intentional one. What is bad about this is the foreclosure of the relationship’s valued possibilities, a loss made true by present traces of the bond and by the survivor’s attachment to the relationship. Unlike deprivationism, the account requires no determinate fact about what would have happened. The result is a relational subsequentism, in which the harm begins with the death, lasts as long as the bond, and is suffered episodically. The account explains why death differs from other separations, why dying young seems worse than dying old, and why prenatal nonexistence is not bad in the same way. Its specificity depends on the Termination Thesis.

Research Square
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (AR)
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
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