Routes and Roots: Uncovering the Origins of DNS Root Server Interception

The Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the most critical components of the Internet. Yet DNS traffic is prone to interception by on-path middleboxes. Building on prior work characterizing DNS response manipulation of DNS root server traffic, this paper investigates the underlying routing and infrastructure factors that enable interception exposure.We present a large-scale, 29-month measurement study of DNS root server interception using over 15 K RIPE Atlas probes. We combine DNS-level interception detection with autonomous system (AS) relationship traceroute analysis to identify not only which networks intercept root-bound traffic, but why interception varies across paths. We use change-point detection to relate these patterns to root server deployment events over time. Our results show that anomalous root-bound routing is concentrated in a small number of networks. Among paths whose penultimate AS has no documented relationship with root servers (candidates for anomalous routing rather than confirmed interception), the top 10 penultimate autonomous systems account for 74.7% of such paths in IPv4 and 76.6% in IPv6. These no-relationship paths exhibit 21–23% lower destination RTTs than documented-relationship paths, consistent with traffic terminating closer to the probe than legitimate root servers. More broadly, we show that interception is largely path-dependent rather than nationally uniform, with probes in the same country exhibiting sharply divergent rates.We find no reliable evidence that deploying new root server instances influences interception rates. Likewise, interception change points show no statistically significant association with deployment events. Where interception does drop near a deployment, it coincides with an upstream routing change, motivating path-aware deployment planning as a direction for future work.

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Publication Details

Journal
Proceedings of the ACM on Networking
Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1145/3856974
Primary Topic
Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Type
article
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article

Routes and Roots: Uncovering the Origins of DNS Root Server Interception

Orçun Çetin, Yevheniya Nosyk, Qasim Lone, Duygu Tümer et al.
Proceedings of the ACM on Networking
Network Security and Intrusion Detection
article

Routes and Roots: Uncovering the Origins of DNS Root Server Interception

Orçun Çetin, Yevheniya Nosyk, Qasim Lone, Duygu Tümer, Batuhan Kertmen
article en

Abstract

The Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the most critical components of the Internet. Yet DNS traffic is prone to interception by on-path middleboxes. Building on prior work characterizing DNS response manipulation of DNS root server traffic, this paper investigates the underlying routing and infrastructure factors that enable interception exposure.We present a large-scale, 29-month measurement study of DNS root server interception using over 15 K RIPE Atlas probes. We combine DNS-level interception detection with autonomous system (AS) relationship traceroute analysis to identify not only which networks intercept root-bound traffic, but why interception varies across paths. We use change-point detection to relate these patterns to root server deployment events over time. Our results show that anomalous root-bound routing is concentrated in a small number of networks. Among paths whose penultimate AS has no documented relationship with root servers (candidates for anomalous routing rather than confirmed interception), the top 10 penultimate autonomous systems account for 74.7% of such paths in IPv4 and 76.6% in IPv6. These no-relationship paths exhibit 21–23% lower destination RTTs than documented-relationship paths, consistent with traffic terminating closer to the probe than legitimate root servers. More broadly, we show that interception is largely path-dependent rather than nationally uniform, with probes in the same country exhibiting sharply divergent rates.We find no reliable evidence that deploying new root server instances influences interception rates. Likewise, interception change points show no statistically significant association with deployment events. Where interception does drop near a deployment, it coincides with an upstream routing change, motivating path-aware deployment planning as a direction for future work.

Proceedings of the ACM on NetworkingVol. 4(CoNEXT4)
Sabancı Üniversitesi (TR)
Network Security and Intrusion Detection
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