On a Secretary Problem with Two Equal-Sized Pools of Candidates

This paper presents the solution of a secretary type problem where the decision maker observes a sequence of offers of two types. There are N objects of both types and these objects appear to the decision maker in random order. Objects can only be compared when they are of the same type. The objects of a given type that have already appeared can be ranked according to a complete order. Objects of different types are not comparable. On the appearance of an object, the decision maker must decide whether to accept that object (and thus stop searching) or irrevocably reject it (and thus continue searching). The goal of the decision maker is to accept an object that is the best of its type. The authors present the general form of the optimal policy and the asymptotical solution. The authors give a strong result describing whether an object of relative rank one should be accepted when the same number of objects of both types have been seen.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.24724
Primary Topic
Optimization and Search Problems
Type
preprint
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
preprint

On a Secretary Problem with Two Equal-Sized Pools of Candidates

Michał Morayne, David Ramsey, Małgorzata Kuchta, Małgorzata Sulkowska
arXiv (Cornell University)
Optimization and Search Problems
preprint

On a Secretary Problem with Two Equal-Sized Pools of Candidates

Michał Morayne, David Ramsey, Małgorzata Kuchta, Małgorzata Sulkowska
preprint en

Abstract

This paper presents the solution of a secretary type problem where the decision maker observes a sequence of offers of two types. There are N objects of both types and these objects appear to the decision maker in random order. Objects can only be compared when they are of the same type. The objects of a given type that have already appeared can be ranked according to a complete order. Objects of different types are not comparable. On the appearance of an object, the decision maker must decide whether to accept that object (and thus stop searching) or irrevocably reject it (and thus continue searching). The goal of the decision maker is to accept an object that is the best of its type. The authors present the general form of the optimal policy and the asymptotical solution. The authors give a strong result describing whether an object of relative rank one should be accepted when the same number of objects of both types have been seen.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Optimization and Search Problems
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Laika access coming soon