Your face is your new PIN and you can't change it

This working paper examines the legal and regulatory implications of biometric authentication in South African digital banking. It focuses on facial recognition fraud and on who bears the loss when an unauthorised electronic transaction is approved by a face. Banks increasingly rely on facial recognition to link devices, recover banking profiles and approve payments. That creates a problem that credential-based security frameworks were not designed to address. Unlike a PIN or password, a person’s face cannot be changed once it has been compromised. The article distinguishes three forms of biometric fraud: synthetic faces, stolen faces and genuine faces obtained through deception. The main argument is that a successful biometric match does not, without more, establish consent, mandate or payment authority. Authentication is not authorisation. The article tests this distinction against the common-law banking mandate, including Absa Bank Ltd v Hanley, and against sections 24 and 25 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. It argues that attribution of a data message should not be treated as proof that the customer authorised the underlying instruction. It also considers whether customer negligence, contractual deeming clauses or ostensible authority can shift the loss to a customer who did not give the instruction. It further examines the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013, the Conduct Standard for Banks, the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, the Code of Banking Practice and National Financial Ombud practice. The article proposes a five-link analytical test for biometric authorisation: capture integrity, identity, purpose, mandate and evidence. It identifies a structural evidential imbalance, in which the bank controls the authentication system and also holds the records later relied on to prove that the customer authorised the transaction. Comparative analysis draws on the EU Payment Services Directive, the Court of Justice of the European Union's decision in Tukowiecka (C-70/25) and a 2026 judgment of the Belgian Court of Cassation. The article also examines the South African Reserve Bank’s draft Authorisation Framework (May 2026). It identifies an evidential asymmetry in the draft: one provision allows a provider to rely on evidence of "informed consent or authentication", while its counterpart refers to “informed consent or authorisation”. The working paper argues for clearer evidential responsibility, stronger consumer protection and greater institutional accountability as biometric authentication becomes embedded in digital financial services. It distinguishes existing South African law from the doctrinal and regulatory proposals it advances.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24372609
Primary Topic
Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Your face is your new PIN and you can't change it

Nicole Govender
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
article

Your face is your new PIN and you can't change it

Nicole Govender
article en

Abstract

This working paper examines the legal and regulatory implications of biometric authentication in South African digital banking. It focuses on facial recognition fraud and on who bears the loss when an unauthorised electronic transaction is approved by a face. Banks increasingly rely on facial recognition to link devices, recover banking profiles and approve payments. That creates a problem that credential-based security frameworks were not designed to address. Unlike a PIN or password, a person’s face cannot be changed once it has been compromised. The article distinguishes three forms of biometric fraud: synthetic faces, stolen faces and genuine faces obtained through deception. The main argument is that a successful biometric match does not, without more, establish consent, mandate or payment authority. Authentication is not authorisation. The article tests this distinction against the common-law banking mandate, including Absa Bank Ltd v Hanley, and against sections 24 and 25 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. It argues that attribution of a data message should not be treated as proof that the customer authorised the underlying instruction. It also considers whether customer negligence, contractual deeming clauses or ostensible authority can shift the loss to a customer who did not give the instruction. It further examines the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013, the Conduct Standard for Banks, the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, the Code of Banking Practice and National Financial Ombud practice. The article proposes a five-link analytical test for biometric authorisation: capture integrity, identity, purpose, mandate and evidence. It identifies a structural evidential imbalance, in which the bank controls the authentication system and also holds the records later relied on to prove that the customer authorised the transaction. Comparative analysis draws on the EU Payment Services Directive, the Court of Justice of the European Union's decision in Tukowiecka (C-70/25) and a 2026 judgment of the Belgian Court of Cassation. The article also examines the South African Reserve Bank’s draft Authorisation Framework (May 2026). It identifies an evidential asymmetry in the draft: one provision allows a provider to rely on evidence of "informed consent or authentication", while its counterpart refers to “informed consent or authorisation”. The working paper argues for clearer evidential responsibility, stronger consumer protection and greater institutional accountability as biometric authentication becomes embedded in digital financial services. It distinguishes existing South African law from the doctrinal and regulatory proposals it advances.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
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