Service Pricing and Strategic Research on Platform Competition in the Overcapacity Ride-Hailing Market

Against the backdrop of excess driver capacity and competition among multiple ride-hailing platforms, this study develops a duopoly pricing game model based on two-sided market theory and the Hotelling framework to investigate platforms’ service strategy choices between ride-pooling and discounted services. It further examines the mechanisms through which relevant factors affect platform profits and social welfare. The results show that, under conditions of excess capacity, the alignment of platforms’ equilibrium service choices, sustained profitability, and social welfare depends jointly on drivers’ preference costs and the fixed compensation paid by platforms to drivers. When drivers’ preference costs are low, the two platforms tend to adopt homogeneous ride-pooling strategies, with their choices influenced by driver compensation, thereby relying on scale effects to sustain profitability. When drivers’ preference costs are moderate to high, platforms tend to adopt differentiated service strategies in response to changes in driver compensation. Only when drivers’ preference costs are appropriately aligned with the fixed compensation offered by platforms can the equilibrium service configuration simultaneously support platform profitability and the highest level of social welfare. Otherwise, intensified price competition may arise, resulting in social welfare losses.

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Publication Details

Journal
Systems
Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/systems14111499
Primary Topic
Digital Platforms and Economics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Service Pricing and Strategic Research on Platform Competition in the Overcapacity Ride-Hailing Market

Shiyun Huang, Hao Li, Qiaoyu Liu
Systems
Digital Platforms and Economics
article

Service Pricing and Strategic Research on Platform Competition in the Overcapacity Ride-Hailing Market

Shiyun Huang, Hao Li, Qiaoyu Liu
article en

Abstract

Against the backdrop of excess driver capacity and competition among multiple ride-hailing platforms, this study develops a duopoly pricing game model based on two-sided market theory and the Hotelling framework to investigate platforms’ service strategy choices between ride-pooling and discounted services. It further examines the mechanisms through which relevant factors affect platform profits and social welfare. The results show that, under conditions of excess capacity, the alignment of platforms’ equilibrium service choices, sustained profitability, and social welfare depends jointly on drivers’ preference costs and the fixed compensation paid by platforms to drivers. When drivers’ preference costs are low, the two platforms tend to adopt homogeneous ride-pooling strategies, with their choices influenced by driver compensation, thereby relying on scale effects to sustain profitability. When drivers’ preference costs are moderate to high, platforms tend to adopt differentiated service strategies in response to changes in driver compensation. Only when drivers’ preference costs are appropriately aligned with the fixed compensation offered by platforms can the equilibrium service configuration simultaneously support platform profitability and the highest level of social welfare. Otherwise, intensified price competition may arise, resulting in social welfare losses.

SystemsVol. 14(11)
Chongqing Jiaotong University (CN)
Digital Platforms and Economics
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