FUNDAMENTOS PEIRCIANOS PARA UMA CIÊNCIA COLABORATIVA

Charles Sanders Peirce’s epistemology provides theoretical foundations for conceivingscience as a collaborative enterprise capable of overcoming the fragmentation of knowledgegenerated by modern disciplinary specialization. This article examines how the Peircean conception of science, understood as a dynamic, fallibilist, and inherently collective process, articulates abductive reasoning, the community of inquirers, and the classification of the sciences within a theoretical framework aimed at the integration of knowledge. I argue that this classification functions as an institutional mechanism of collective correction among disciplines. The article also examines the role of final causation and the statistical regularity of natural laws in supporting this proposal, as well as the tensions that traverse it, including the persistence of criteria of abstraction within Peirce’s classification and the limits of the assumption of mutualrecognition among inquirers, considered in light of Donna Haraway’s and Isabelle Stengers’s situated critiques of the modern sciences. Finally, I argue that, despite these tensions, Peirce’s epistemology remains a valuable theoretical resource for addressing, in a cooperative manner, the contemporary challenges that cut across different fields of knowledge.

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Publication Details

Journal
Kínesis - Revista de Estudos dos Pós-Graduandos em Filosofia
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.36311/1984-8900.2026.v18n44.p133-158
Primary Topic
Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education
Type
article
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article

FUNDAMENTOS PEIRCIANOS PARA UMA CIÊNCIA COLABORATIVA

Max Rogério Vicentini
Kínesis - Revista de Estudos dos Pós-Graduandos em Filosofia
Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education
article

FUNDAMENTOS PEIRCIANOS PARA UMA CIÊNCIA COLABORATIVA

Max Rogério Vicentini
article en

Abstract

Charles Sanders Peirce’s epistemology provides theoretical foundations for conceivingscience as a collaborative enterprise capable of overcoming the fragmentation of knowledgegenerated by modern disciplinary specialization. This article examines how the Peircean conception of science, understood as a dynamic, fallibilist, and inherently collective process, articulates abductive reasoning, the community of inquirers, and the classification of the sciences within a theoretical framework aimed at the integration of knowledge. I argue that this classification functions as an institutional mechanism of collective correction among disciplines. The article also examines the role of final causation and the statistical regularity of natural laws in supporting this proposal, as well as the tensions that traverse it, including the persistence of criteria of abstraction within Peirce’s classification and the limits of the assumption of mutualrecognition among inquirers, considered in light of Donna Haraway’s and Isabelle Stengers’s situated critiques of the modern sciences. Finally, I argue that, despite these tensions, Peirce’s epistemology remains a valuable theoretical resource for addressing, in a cooperative manner, the contemporary challenges that cut across different fields of knowledge.

Kínesis - Revista de Estudos dos Pós-Graduandos em FilosofiaVol. 18(44)
Universidade Estadual de Maringá (BR)
Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education
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