Executive Pay Ceilings, Corporate Risk‐Taking and Strategic Rebalancing

Employing the 2014 mandatory pay ceiling regulation for top executives in Chinese state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) as a quasi‐natural experiment, this paper adopts a difference‐in‐differences (DiD) approach and finds that the regulation significantly reduces corporate risk‐taking among SOEs. The reduction is more pronounced under greater policy uncertainty, among firms led by younger chairpersons, and when executives experience larger pay cuts. The decline does not reflect a broad contraction in investment. Acquisition frequency and transaction value fall significantly, whereas R&D and capital expenditures remain largely unchanged. At the same time, treated SOEs increase CSR performance, CSR disclosure and employment growth. Textual analysis of Management's Discussion and Analysis disclosures reveals a corresponding reorientation of managerial attention, with greater attention to political objectives and less attention to economic objectives. Relative political orientation also becomes more positively associated with subsequent political promotion after the reform. Overall, our findings suggest that pay ceilings reweight executives' economic and political career incentives, leading them to rebalance strategic priorities rather than simply reduce managerial activity.

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Publication Details

Journal
International Journal of Finance & Economics
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.70335
Primary Topic
Corporate Finance and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Executive Pay Ceilings, Corporate Risk‐Taking and Strategic Rebalancing

张振伟, Yue Li, Min Bai, Wenjing Li
2 links
International Journal of Finance & Economics
Corporate Finance and Governance
article

Executive Pay Ceilings, Corporate Risk‐Taking and Strategic Rebalancing

张振伟, Yue Li, Min Bai, Wenjing Li
article en

Abstract

Employing the 2014 mandatory pay ceiling regulation for top executives in Chinese state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) as a quasi‐natural experiment, this paper adopts a difference‐in‐differences (DiD) approach and finds that the regulation significantly reduces corporate risk‐taking among SOEs. The reduction is more pronounced under greater policy uncertainty, among firms led by younger chairpersons, and when executives experience larger pay cuts. The decline does not reflect a broad contraction in investment. Acquisition frequency and transaction value fall significantly, whereas R&D and capital expenditures remain largely unchanged. At the same time, treated SOEs increase CSR performance, CSR disclosure and employment growth. Textual analysis of Management's Discussion and Analysis disclosures reveals a corresponding reorientation of managerial attention, with greater attention to political objectives and less attention to economic objectives. Relative political orientation also becomes more positively associated with subsequent political promotion after the reform. Overall, our findings suggest that pay ceilings reweight executives' economic and political career incentives, leading them to rebalance strategic priorities rather than simply reduce managerial activity.

International Journal of Finance & Economics
Tarim University (CN), Huazhong University of Science and Technology (CN), University of Science and Technology Beijing (CN)
National Natural Science Foundation of China, Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China
Peace, justice, and strong institutions, Decent work and economic growth
Corporate Finance and Governance
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