Who Pays for Product Returns? Advertising and Return Policies

An online marketplace decides how consumers, firms, and the platform share the cost of product returns. We study this decision when the platform earns commissions and sells prominent placement. Consumers inspect, try, and return products; firms bid for the first position and then set prices. Earlier display attracts more trials but can retain a smaller fraction of them. For small positive losses, assigning return costs to consumers raises the value of prominence relative to reimbursing firms by the same amount. Advertising therefore shifts the platform's preferred division of a given return bill toward consumers. We characterize the joint allocation for small positive return losses and give a cost condition under which the platform pays nothing. In markets with frequent returns, the platform can instead share the bill with consumers: a higher commission makes it pay more to encourage shopping and retained sales. Results at finite losses show that advertising can change the optimal policy from firm-paid free returns to full consumer payment, reducing both commissions and consumer surplus. This advertising-induced policy change can lower or raise total welfare, depending on whether savings from fewer trials and returns offset the loss from reduced. participation.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.22370
Primary Topic
Digital Platforms and Economics
Type
preprint
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preprint

Who Pays for Product Returns? Advertising and Return Policies

武玙璠, Zhang Mingsheng, Sanxi Li, Jun Yu
arXiv (Cornell University)
Digital Platforms and Economics
preprint

Who Pays for Product Returns? Advertising and Return Policies

武玙璠, Zhang Mingsheng, Sanxi Li, Jun Yu
preprint en

Abstract

An online marketplace decides how consumers, firms, and the platform share the cost of product returns. We study this decision when the platform earns commissions and sells prominent placement. Consumers inspect, try, and return products; firms bid for the first position and then set prices. Earlier display attracts more trials but can retain a smaller fraction of them. For small positive losses, assigning return costs to consumers raises the value of prominence relative to reimbursing firms by the same amount. Advertising therefore shifts the platform's preferred division of a given return bill toward consumers. We characterize the joint allocation for small positive return losses and give a cost condition under which the platform pays nothing. In markets with frequent returns, the platform can instead share the bill with consumers: a higher commission makes it pay more to encourage shopping and retained sales. Results at finite losses show that advertising can change the optimal policy from firm-paid free returns to full consumer payment, reducing both commissions and consumer surplus. This advertising-induced policy change can lower or raise total welfare, depending on whether savings from fewer trials and returns offset the loss from reduced. participation.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Digital Platforms and Economics
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