Rooted protection: Designing optimal joint contract for realising the complementarity of forest-based solutions and financial insurance
As natural hazards increasingly threaten mountainous areas, Improved Forest Management (IFM) presents a promising Nature-Based Solution. We develop a Principal-Agent model where a houseowner uses both IFM and financial insurance. We demonstrate a perfect complementarity: forests filter low-severity harms, enabling insurers to provide affordable coverage for residual tail risks. This combination resolves the traditional partial insurance puzzle, enabling high or even full coverage despite unfair premiums. However, as this hybrid strategy reduces insurers’ profits, private markets fail to incentivize socially optimal levels of protection. Thus, public intervention or public insurers are needed to align private incentives with social welfare. JEL Classifications: G22 (Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies) , Q54 (Climate, Natural Disasters and Their Management, Global Warming) , D86 (Economics of Contract: Theory).
Authors
- Marc Hanewinkel (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4081-6621)
- Roland Olschewski (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3027-2897)
- Julien Jacob (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2258-4591)
- Sandrine Brèteau-Amores (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6545-3532)
- Rasoul Yousefpour (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3604-8279)
Institutions
- University of Freiburg (DE)
- University of Toronto (CA)
- Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and Landscape Research (CH)
- Association Pôle Environnement Sud Aquitaine (FR)
- Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée (FR)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Research Square
- Published
- 2026-11-18
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11554909/v1
- Primary Topic
- Insurance and Financial Risk Management
- Type
- preprint
Funders
- European Commission
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche