Rooted protection: Designing optimal joint contract for realising the complementarity of forest-based solutions and financial insurance

As natural hazards increasingly threaten mountainous areas, Improved Forest Management (IFM) presents a promising Nature-Based Solution. We develop a Principal-Agent model where a houseowner uses both IFM and financial insurance. We demonstrate a perfect complementarity: forests filter low-severity harms, enabling insurers to provide affordable coverage for residual tail risks. This combination resolves the traditional partial insurance puzzle, enabling high or even full coverage despite unfair premiums. However, as this hybrid strategy reduces insurers’ profits, private markets fail to incentivize socially optimal levels of protection. Thus, public intervention or public insurers are needed to align private incentives with social welfare. JEL Classifications: G22 (Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies) , Q54 (Climate, Natural Disasters and Their Management, Global Warming) , D86 (Economics of Contract: Theory).

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Publication Details

Journal
Research Square
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11554909/v1
Primary Topic
Insurance and Financial Risk Management
Type
preprint

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preprint

Rooted protection: Designing optimal joint contract for realising the complementarity of forest-based solutions and financial insurance

Marc Hanewinkel, Roland Olschewski, Julien Jacob, Sandrine Brèteau-Amores et al.
Research Square
Insurance and Financial Risk Management
preprint

Rooted protection: Designing optimal joint contract for realising the complementarity of forest-based solutions and financial insurance

Marc Hanewinkel, Roland Olschewski, Julien Jacob, Sandrine Brèteau-Amores, Rasoul Yousefpour
preprint en

Abstract

As natural hazards increasingly threaten mountainous areas, Improved Forest Management (IFM) presents a promising Nature-Based Solution. We develop a Principal-Agent model where a houseowner uses both IFM and financial insurance. We demonstrate a perfect complementarity: forests filter low-severity harms, enabling insurers to provide affordable coverage for residual tail risks. This combination resolves the traditional partial insurance puzzle, enabling high or even full coverage despite unfair premiums. However, as this hybrid strategy reduces insurers’ profits, private markets fail to incentivize socially optimal levels of protection. Thus, public intervention or public insurers are needed to align private incentives with social welfare. JEL Classifications: G22 (Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies) , Q54 (Climate, Natural Disasters and Their Management, Global Warming) , D86 (Economics of Contract: Theory).

Research Square
University of Freiburg (DE), University of Toronto (CA), Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and Landscape Research (CH), Association Pôle Environnement Sud Aquitaine (FR), Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée (FR)
European Commission, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Agence Nationale de la Recherche
Life on land, No poverty
Insurance and Financial Risk Management
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