Re-reading Justice as Fairness Without Market-Based Assumptions

Abstract In A Theory of Justice , the principles of justice as fairness are selected via the original position. In the original position parties only know minimal, highly ‘general facts’ about human society, psychology, and politics, including principles of economic theory. While admitting ‘general facts’ of economic theory looks innocuous, which facts count matters. In the end Rawls permits only market-based regimes—property-owning democracy and liberal socialism—as possible just economic orders. However, this narrowing of the option set does not follow Rawls’s own procedure, admitting order-specific assumptions into the original position and across a procedure that is supposed to remain abstract. Moreover, when these assumptions filter into the original position, justice as fairness becomes a framework for arranging and regulating market-based institutions, rather than a test for a just economic order. If the original position and four-stage sequence were applied as Rawls originally described—open to institutional form under certain constraints—then Rawls’s procedure does not logically entail market-based systems but constrains them. If justice as fairness is to provide more than just conceptual and normative resources for evaluating market-based orders, my critique provides insight for where to begin, and that is with Rawls’s economic assumptions.

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Publication Details

Journal
Res Publica
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-026-09803-9
Primary Topic
Political Philosophy and Ethics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Re-reading Justice as Fairness Without Market-Based Assumptions

Glorianne Craig
Res Publica
Political Philosophy and Ethics
article

Re-reading Justice as Fairness Without Market-Based Assumptions

Glorianne Craig
article en

Abstract

Abstract In A Theory of Justice , the principles of justice as fairness are selected via the original position. In the original position parties only know minimal, highly ‘general facts’ about human society, psychology, and politics, including principles of economic theory. While admitting ‘general facts’ of economic theory looks innocuous, which facts count matters. In the end Rawls permits only market-based regimes—property-owning democracy and liberal socialism—as possible just economic orders. However, this narrowing of the option set does not follow Rawls’s own procedure, admitting order-specific assumptions into the original position and across a procedure that is supposed to remain abstract. Moreover, when these assumptions filter into the original position, justice as fairness becomes a framework for arranging and regulating market-based institutions, rather than a test for a just economic order. If the original position and four-stage sequence were applied as Rawls originally described—open to institutional form under certain constraints—then Rawls’s procedure does not logically entail market-based systems but constrains them. If justice as fairness is to provide more than just conceptual and normative resources for evaluating market-based orders, my critique provides insight for where to begin, and that is with Rawls’s economic assumptions.

Res Publica
University of Potsdam (DE)
Political Philosophy and Ethics
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