Temporal tradeoffs and contracting dynamics in buyer–supplier agreements

Research Summary We examine temporal tradeoffs and contracting dynamics in buyer–supplier agreements by investigating how suppliers' contractual terms change when contracting with initial clients versus new clients in the future. We use information economics and research on certifications in interorganizational relationships to delve into the mechanisms leading to potential improvements in suppliers' contractual terms. We situate the empirical analysis in the context of onshore oil and gas drilling projects to examine the liabilities for project‐related risks that startup drillers assume when contracting with client producers. Evidence indicates that when drillers initially work for prominent client producers, the drillers assume more risks in these first contracts, but fewer risks in subsequent agreements with other client producers. We argue and show that the degree to which a specific driller obtains better terms in future deals owing to its initial client's prominence will be attenuated when subsequent clients have more information on the value of the driller's resources and capabilities. Specifically, the resulting reduction in risks borne by the driller will be smaller when the driller was founded by a serial entrepreneur and when the subsequent client is vertically integrated into drilling operations. Managerial Summary This study examines the contracting dynamics that startups experience as suppliers in buyer–supplier agreements. Startups often bear more risk in initial deals to build credibility, especially when contracting with prominent clients, and such affiliations can then lead to improved terms for startups in subsequent contracts with other clients. However, this follow‐on benefit of working with a prominent client depends upon whether subsequent clients have more information on the startup's resources and capabilities. In particular, the risk‐reduction effect of working with an initial client that is prominent will be smaller for those startups founded by serial entrepreneurs. It will also be smaller when the subsequent client is vertically integrated into the value chain activities carried out by the startup. Using data from startups in the oil and gas drilling industry, we illustrate the dynamics and tradeoffs that startup drillers encounter when contracting with established client producers.

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Publication Details

Journal
Strategic Management Journal
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.70142
Primary Topic
Outsourcing and Supply Chain Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Temporal tradeoffs and contracting dynamics in buyer–supplier agreements

Jeffrey J. Reuer, Toby Li
Strategic Management Journal
Outsourcing and Supply Chain Management
article

Temporal tradeoffs and contracting dynamics in buyer–supplier agreements

Jeffrey J. Reuer, Toby Li
article en

Abstract

Research Summary We examine temporal tradeoffs and contracting dynamics in buyer–supplier agreements by investigating how suppliers' contractual terms change when contracting with initial clients versus new clients in the future. We use information economics and research on certifications in interorganizational relationships to delve into the mechanisms leading to potential improvements in suppliers' contractual terms. We situate the empirical analysis in the context of onshore oil and gas drilling projects to examine the liabilities for project‐related risks that startup drillers assume when contracting with client producers. Evidence indicates that when drillers initially work for prominent client producers, the drillers assume more risks in these first contracts, but fewer risks in subsequent agreements with other client producers. We argue and show that the degree to which a specific driller obtains better terms in future deals owing to its initial client's prominence will be attenuated when subsequent clients have more information on the value of the driller's resources and capabilities. Specifically, the resulting reduction in risks borne by the driller will be smaller when the driller was founded by a serial entrepreneur and when the subsequent client is vertically integrated into drilling operations. Managerial Summary This study examines the contracting dynamics that startups experience as suppliers in buyer–supplier agreements. Startups often bear more risk in initial deals to build credibility, especially when contracting with prominent clients, and such affiliations can then lead to improved terms for startups in subsequent contracts with other clients. However, this follow‐on benefit of working with a prominent client depends upon whether subsequent clients have more information on the startup's resources and capabilities. In particular, the risk‐reduction effect of working with an initial client that is prominent will be smaller for those startups founded by serial entrepreneurs. It will also be smaller when the subsequent client is vertically integrated into the value chain activities carried out by the startup. Using data from startups in the oil and gas drilling industry, we illustrate the dynamics and tradeoffs that startup drillers encounter when contracting with established client producers.

Strategic Management Journal
Purdue University West Lafayette (US), Texas A&M University (US)
Decent work and economic growth
Outsourcing and Supply Chain Management
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