The Problem of the Infinite Regress of Ends

ABSTRACT This paper articulates the Problem of the Infinite Regress of Ends , a neglected difficulty in the theory of practical reason. Philosophers commonly hold that rational action must be justified by an end as its reason. Yet for that end to function as a reason, it seems that the end itself must be justified by a further end as its reason, giving rise to an apparent regress. I argue that this regress results from two seemingly compelling principles: No Arbitrary Ends and No Circular Ends . Each principle is required by the nature of practical reasoning, but together they entail that there must be an infinite regress of ends in the course of action justification. However, I show that the very nature of practical reasoning also implies that the order of action justification cannot extend infinitely. Thus another principle, No Infinite Regress of Ends , holds, and it is inconsistent with No Circular Ends and No Arbitrary Ends. Furthermore, the same underlying structure that supports No Infinite Regress of Ends also supports No Arbitrary Ends and No Circular Ends. The resulting trilemma reveals that any adequate account of practical reason must explain how justification can terminate without arbitrariness or circularity.

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Publication Details

Journal
Ratio
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.70049
Primary Topic
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

The Problem of the Infinite Regress of Ends

Kyoungmin Cho
Ratio
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
article

The Problem of the Infinite Regress of Ends

Kyoungmin Cho
article en

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper articulates the Problem of the Infinite Regress of Ends , a neglected difficulty in the theory of practical reason. Philosophers commonly hold that rational action must be justified by an end as its reason. Yet for that end to function as a reason, it seems that the end itself must be justified by a further end as its reason, giving rise to an apparent regress. I argue that this regress results from two seemingly compelling principles: No Arbitrary Ends and No Circular Ends . Each principle is required by the nature of practical reasoning, but together they entail that there must be an infinite regress of ends in the course of action justification. However, I show that the very nature of practical reasoning also implies that the order of action justification cannot extend infinitely. Thus another principle, No Infinite Regress of Ends , holds, and it is inconsistent with No Circular Ends and No Arbitrary Ends. Furthermore, the same underlying structure that supports No Infinite Regress of Ends also supports No Arbitrary Ends and No Circular Ends. The resulting trilemma reveals that any adequate account of practical reason must explain how justification can terminate without arbitrariness or circularity.

Ratio
Mount Holyoke College (US)
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
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