GapLeak: When Privacy-Preserving LLM-based Web Agents Become a Privacy Risk

Large Language Model (LLM)-based web agents rely on data minimization and least privilege to protect user privacy. We show that these principles are necessary but insufficient: they constrain authorized sources, but not higher-sensitivity sources that remain reachable. A website can request a field unavailable from authorized sources, creating an information gap. To complete the task, a goal-driven agent may escalate to reachable but unauthorized sources and disclose accumulated sensitive information. We formalize this vulnerability as GapLeak, where an adversary exploits a legitimate web form without prompt injection or other malicious instructions. We evaluate GapLeak on three web-agent frameworks and six LLMs from Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI across recruitment, e-commerce, travel, and healthcare. GapLeak induces an average unauthorized disclosure of approximately 37%. The information gap is the primary driver: eliminating it reduces disclosure by more than 50%. Existing instruction-level defenses based on least privilege partially mitigate the vulnerability but often reduce task success. We propose submission-time verification, which filters unauthorized content before form submission, eliminating over 96% of unauthorized disclosures while preserving task success.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.22223
Primary Topic
Web Application Security Vulnerabilities
Type
preprint
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preprint

GapLeak: When Privacy-Preserving LLM-based Web Agents Become a Privacy Risk

Mohammad Zulkernine, Jianbing Ni, Tiancong Cao, Rongxing Lu et al.
arXiv (Cornell University)
Web Application Security Vulnerabilities
preprint

GapLeak: When Privacy-Preserving LLM-based Web Agents Become a Privacy Risk

Mohammad Zulkernine, Jianbing Ni, Tiancong Cao, Rongxing Lu, Chaklam Cheong, Zelin Zhang, Qi Li
preprint en

Abstract

Large Language Model (LLM)-based web agents rely on data minimization and least privilege to protect user privacy. We show that these principles are necessary but insufficient: they constrain authorized sources, but not higher-sensitivity sources that remain reachable. A website can request a field unavailable from authorized sources, creating an information gap. To complete the task, a goal-driven agent may escalate to reachable but unauthorized sources and disclose accumulated sensitive information. We formalize this vulnerability as GapLeak, where an adversary exploits a legitimate web form without prompt injection or other malicious instructions. We evaluate GapLeak on three web-agent frameworks and six LLMs from Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI across recruitment, e-commerce, travel, and healthcare. GapLeak induces an average unauthorized disclosure of approximately 37%. The information gap is the primary driver: eliminating it reduces disclosure by more than 50%. Existing instruction-level defenses based on least privilege partially mitigate the vulnerability but often reduce task success. We propose submission-time verification, which filters unauthorized content before form submission, eliminating over 96% of unauthorized disclosures while preserving task success.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Web Application Security Vulnerabilities
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