The paradox of mental fiction

Mental fictionalism is a novel position in the philosophy of mind which maintains that propositional attitudes are useful fictions: metaphorical projections of external states onto a fictional inner landscape. Adam Toon's pretense mental fictionalism explains mental discourse in terms of public acts of representation. A central challenge for pretense mental fictionalism is cognitive collapse: the problem of explaining how subjects treat mental states as fictional without positing additional, real mental states. The argument of this paper is that the pretense mental fictionalist can draw on responses to the paradox of fiction to face up to this challenge. We show how the paradox of fiction applies to mental fictionalism, leading to “the paradox of mental fiction,” and draw on three classes of response to show how the mental fictionalist can develop her account of emotions to avoid cognitive collapse. We argue that the pretense mental fictionalist faces challenges in denying each of the three prongs of the paradox, demanding that she develop her proposal further.

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Publication Details

Journal
Philosophical Psychology
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2026.2763630
Primary Topic
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

The paradox of mental fiction

Ella Watson, Calum Sims
2 links
Philosophical Psychology
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
article

The paradox of mental fiction

Ella Watson, Calum Sims
article en

Abstract

Mental fictionalism is a novel position in the philosophy of mind which maintains that propositional attitudes are useful fictions: metaphorical projections of external states onto a fictional inner landscape. Adam Toon's pretense mental fictionalism explains mental discourse in terms of public acts of representation. A central challenge for pretense mental fictionalism is cognitive collapse: the problem of explaining how subjects treat mental states as fictional without positing additional, real mental states. The argument of this paper is that the pretense mental fictionalist can draw on responses to the paradox of fiction to face up to this challenge. We show how the paradox of fiction applies to mental fictionalism, leading to “the paradox of mental fiction,” and draw on three classes of response to show how the mental fictionalist can develop her account of emotions to avoid cognitive collapse. We argue that the pretense mental fictionalist faces challenges in denying each of the three prongs of the paradox, demanding that she develop her proposal further.

Philosophical Psychology
University of Bristol (GB)
University of Bristol
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
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