From Attack Tree to Model Checker: Binding CAPEC Patterns to Verify Robotic System Security
Security-minded verification of autonomous and robotic systems presupposes an attacker, yet the path from a threat catalogue to a checkable attacker model is still traversed by hand. This research preview presents the theory and construction of a pipeline that mechanises it. Each leaf of an attack tree is mapped to a CAPEC attack pattern and written in first-order logic as a rule: the attacker's prerequisites imply the attack's effect. Casting the pattern as such a rule is what makes it operational - its variables can be bound to a specific system's parts, and its prerequisites can then be tested against that system under a chosen configuration of security controls. Binding is our means of verifying whether a system is vulnerable to a given attack: from a bound pattern we derive an attacker model, turn its effect into a temporal-logic property, and check that property against the system with and without a countermeasure, reporting the control that defeats the attack. We describe the signature, schemas, profiles for approach, and explore how CAPEC can support reasoning about robotics security.
Authors
- Clare Dixon (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4610-9533)
- Louise A. Dennis (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1426-1896)
- Marie Farrell (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7708-3877)
- Juel; id_orcid 0009-0003-5323-2286 Hussain
Institutions
- University of Manchester (GB)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
- Published
- 2026-11-17
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.4204/eptcs.457.11
- Primary Topic
- Formal Methods in Verification
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00