Settling the Time and Structural Complexity of Bertrand Networks

In the seminal Bertrand network game introduced by Babaioff et al. (2013), each seller posts a single price to captive buyers and to the markets it shares with neighboring sellers, where sellers cannot price discriminate across the markets. Although the existence of equilibria and polynomial-time algorithms to compute them in trees (Babaioff et al. (2013)) have been known, it has been a major open problem whether there exist efficient algorithms to compute them for general graphs. In this paper, we resolve this open question negatively by proving that computing any constant-error approximate Nash equilibrium in a Bertrand network is $\PPAD$-complete. This hardness holds even on sparse bipartite graphs of maximum degree five with constant integer market weights. Complementing our hardness result, we design an efficient polynomial-time approximation scheme (EPTAS) when both the maximum degree and the number of sellers with captive buyers are bounded. Beyond time complexity, since exact equilibria require randomizing prices over continuous intervals, another fundamental question left open by Babaioff et al. (2013) is whether an exact equilibrium can always be represented with a finite number of price intervals, \ie whether its structural complexity is finite. We resolve this question affirmatively by proving that every achievable equilibrium revenue profile can be realized by an equilibrium with structural complexity $O(2^n)$, which leads to an exact algorithm running in doubly exponential time. We further show that this bound is tight: there exist instances for which the unique equilibrium realizing target revenue profiles has structural complexity $Ω(2^n)$.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.22216
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Applications
Type
preprint
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preprint

Settling the Time and Structural Complexity of Bertrand Networks

MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Suho Shin
arXiv (Cornell University)
Game Theory and Applications
preprint

Settling the Time and Structural Complexity of Bertrand Networks

MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Suho Shin
preprint en

Abstract

In the seminal Bertrand network game introduced by Babaioff et al. (2013), each seller posts a single price to captive buyers and to the markets it shares with neighboring sellers, where sellers cannot price discriminate across the markets. Although the existence of equilibria and polynomial-time algorithms to compute them in trees (Babaioff et al. (2013)) have been known, it has been a major open problem whether there exist efficient algorithms to compute them for general graphs. In this paper, we resolve this open question negatively by proving that computing any constant-error approximate Nash equilibrium in a Bertrand network is $\PPAD$-complete. This hardness holds even on sparse bipartite graphs of maximum degree five with constant integer market weights. Complementing our hardness result, we design an efficient polynomial-time approximation scheme (EPTAS) when both the maximum degree and the number of sellers with captive buyers are bounded. Beyond time complexity, since exact equilibria require randomizing prices over continuous intervals, another fundamental question left open by Babaioff et al. (2013) is whether an exact equilibrium can always be represented with a finite number of price intervals, \ie whether its structural complexity is finite. We resolve this question affirmatively by proving that every achievable equilibrium revenue profile can be realized by an equilibrium with structural complexity $O(2^n)$, which leads to an exact algorithm running in doubly exponential time. We further show that this bound is tight: there exist instances for which the unique equilibrium realizing target revenue profiles has structural complexity $Ω(2^n)$.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Game Theory and Applications
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