The Limits of Freedom of Expression on Social Media and the Establishment of Criminal Liability: A Legal Certainty Perspective

Restrictions on political expression through social media expose a tension between constitutionally protected dissent and the criminal prohibition of incitement, particularly when criminal legislation changes between the alleged conduct and judgment. This doctrinal study examines statutory provisions, constitutional decisions, and the full 120-page judgment in South Jakarta District Court Case No. 675/Pid.Sus/2025/PN Jkt.Sel. It finds that the court applied Article 161(1) of the former Criminal Code rather than Article 247 of the National Criminal Code because the former was more favorable to the defendant. The court distinguished political criticism and emotionally charged speech from a specific post it characterized as encouraging arson, using the Rabat Plan of Action’s six factors and the three-part test for restrictions on expression. It imposed six months’ imprisonment, suspended subject to a one-year period of supervision. The analysis distinguishes the intent to publish from the culpable mental state required for incitement and separates digital attribution from proof of that mental state. Its contribution is a five-stage doctrinal framework integrating temporal legality, classification of expression, evidentiary reliability, culpability, and proportionality.

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Publication Details

Journal
JIHK
Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.46924/jihk.v8i2.549
Primary Topic
Freedom of Expression and Defamation
Type
article
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The Limits of Freedom of Expression on Social Media and the Establishment of Criminal Liability: A Legal Certainty Perspective

Rugun Romaida Hutabarat, Marina Marina
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JIHK
Freedom of Expression and Defamation
article

The Limits of Freedom of Expression on Social Media and the Establishment of Criminal Liability: A Legal Certainty Perspective

Rugun Romaida Hutabarat, Marina Marina
article en

Abstract

Restrictions on political expression through social media expose a tension between constitutionally protected dissent and the criminal prohibition of incitement, particularly when criminal legislation changes between the alleged conduct and judgment. This doctrinal study examines statutory provisions, constitutional decisions, and the full 120-page judgment in South Jakarta District Court Case No. 675/Pid.Sus/2025/PN Jkt.Sel. It finds that the court applied Article 161(1) of the former Criminal Code rather than Article 247 of the National Criminal Code because the former was more favorable to the defendant. The court distinguished political criticism and emotionally charged speech from a specific post it characterized as encouraging arson, using the Rabat Plan of Action’s six factors and the three-part test for restrictions on expression. It imposed six months’ imprisonment, suspended subject to a one-year period of supervision. The analysis distinguishes the intent to publish from the culpable mental state required for incitement and separates digital attribution from proof of that mental state. Its contribution is a five-stage doctrinal framework integrating temporal legality, classification of expression, evidentiary reliability, culpability, and proportionality.

JIHKVol. 8(2)
Tarumanagara University (ID)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Freedom of Expression and Defamation
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