Combatting counterfeits with blockchain: quality information disclosure in genuine vs. counterfeit product markets

Traditional anti-counterfeiting technologies are susceptible to replication and offer limited effectiveness, prompting interest in blockchain as a tamper-resistant alternative. This study develops four Stackelberg game models that incorporate two contractual mechanisms (wholesale price vs. revenue sharing) and two anti-counterfeiting strategies (with vs. without blockchain) to examine how blockchain combats counterfeiting through quality information disclosure. The results indicate that when blockchain adoption costs are low, blockchain implementation reduces prices, shifts novice consumers towards genuine products, and decreases the demand for counterfeit products. With a large proportion of novices and a low blockchain adoption cost, blockchain increases the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer while reducing the counterfeiter’s profit under certain conditions. Compared to wholesale price contracts, revenue sharing contracts better coordinate the supply chain and leverage the manufacturer’s pioneer advantage, resulting in higher manufacturer profits but lower profits for the retailer and the counterfeiter. Moreover, blockchain improves consumer surplus and social welfare, especially with a high proportion of novices or low prior probability of novices. Managerially, blockchain adoption should consider contract types, the proportion of novices, and their prior probabilities of the product being genuine. The genuine supply chain should adopt blockchain primarily for newly launched rather than established products.

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Publication Details

Journal
International Journal of Production Research
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2026.2734205
Primary Topic
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Combatting counterfeits with blockchain: quality information disclosure in genuine vs. counterfeit product markets

Mingyang Chen, Liuxin Zou, Han Gao, Jiang Wu
3 links
International Journal of Production Research
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
article

Combatting counterfeits with blockchain: quality information disclosure in genuine vs. counterfeit product markets

Mingyang Chen, Liuxin Zou, Han Gao, Jiang Wu
article en

Abstract

Traditional anti-counterfeiting technologies are susceptible to replication and offer limited effectiveness, prompting interest in blockchain as a tamper-resistant alternative. This study develops four Stackelberg game models that incorporate two contractual mechanisms (wholesale price vs. revenue sharing) and two anti-counterfeiting strategies (with vs. without blockchain) to examine how blockchain combats counterfeiting through quality information disclosure. The results indicate that when blockchain adoption costs are low, blockchain implementation reduces prices, shifts novice consumers towards genuine products, and decreases the demand for counterfeit products. With a large proportion of novices and a low blockchain adoption cost, blockchain increases the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer while reducing the counterfeiter’s profit under certain conditions. Compared to wholesale price contracts, revenue sharing contracts better coordinate the supply chain and leverage the manufacturer’s pioneer advantage, resulting in higher manufacturer profits but lower profits for the retailer and the counterfeiter. Moreover, blockchain improves consumer surplus and social welfare, especially with a high proportion of novices or low prior probability of novices. Managerially, blockchain adoption should consider contract types, the proportion of novices, and their prior probabilities of the product being genuine. The genuine supply chain should adopt blockchain primarily for newly launched rather than established products.

International Journal of Production Research
Chongqing Normal University (CN), Henan University (CN), Wuhan University (CN), École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (CH)
Chongqing Normal University, National Natural Science Foundation of China, China Postdoctoral Science Foundation
Industry, innovation and infrastructure
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
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