AdFactory: Feasibility and Failure Modes of AI-Based Arabic Video Production for a Crowdsourced TDoS Scenario

How feasible is traceable Arabic video production for a crowdsourced telephony denial-of-service (TDoS) scenario, and which failures limit its evaluation? AdFactory uses commercial services to produce presenter videos (Influencer mode) and four-scene product advertisements (Luxury mode) from fixed presenter and product sources. Influencer mode returned 47 completed outputs from 54 planned comparisons; outputs labeled MultiTalk matched their Hunyuan counterparts by recorded SHA-256, so that route’s backend model remains unconfirmed. Luxury mode returned four complete clips in 27 of 28 first attempts, but only 13 supported a complete composite score. Pilot-exclusion, weight-sensitivity and paired-effect analyses expose measurement limitations. Influencer cost is the recorded or reserved amount (the greater of recorded cost and preflight estimate), not verified cash expenditure or full-pipeline costs. The platform draws the telephone number at assembly, so a sampled optical character recognition (OCR) audit depends mainly on the rendering template and the OCR tool and does not compare generation engines. A separate two-class queueing analysis examines capacity trade-offs; queue inputs remain synthetic. Public posting was disabled, but unlisted inspection URLs remained publicly retrievable. We measured neither audience conversion nor live telephone disruption. In a blinded rating of 32 new clips by 62 adult Arabic-speaking volunteers, 84% of all ratings were the top category and inter-rater agreement was near zero. Route differences were at most 0.16 scale points, and clips with documented visible defects were rated like the others, so we do not present these scores as evidence of realism. These findings show bounded production feasibility and measurement failures, but establish neither an overall engine ranking nor end-to-end attack feasibility. The work therefore characterizes an integrated, production-side path for a crowdsourced TDoS scenario, not a new telephony-level attack mechanism.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/jcp6060208
Primary Topic
Spam and Phishing Detection
Type
article
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article

AdFactory: Feasibility and Failure Modes of AI-Based Arabic Video Production for a Crowdsourced TDoS Scenario

Oussama Benrhouma, Muhammad Shoaib Siddiqui, Hesham Ali Ghanem Alsenani
3 links
Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy
Spam and Phishing Detection
article

AdFactory: Feasibility and Failure Modes of AI-Based Arabic Video Production for a Crowdsourced TDoS Scenario

Oussama Benrhouma, Muhammad Shoaib Siddiqui, Hesham Ali Ghanem Alsenani
article en

Abstract

How feasible is traceable Arabic video production for a crowdsourced telephony denial-of-service (TDoS) scenario, and which failures limit its evaluation? AdFactory uses commercial services to produce presenter videos (Influencer mode) and four-scene product advertisements (Luxury mode) from fixed presenter and product sources. Influencer mode returned 47 completed outputs from 54 planned comparisons; outputs labeled MultiTalk matched their Hunyuan counterparts by recorded SHA-256, so that route’s backend model remains unconfirmed. Luxury mode returned four complete clips in 27 of 28 first attempts, but only 13 supported a complete composite score. Pilot-exclusion, weight-sensitivity and paired-effect analyses expose measurement limitations. Influencer cost is the recorded or reserved amount (the greater of recorded cost and preflight estimate), not verified cash expenditure or full-pipeline costs. The platform draws the telephone number at assembly, so a sampled optical character recognition (OCR) audit depends mainly on the rendering template and the OCR tool and does not compare generation engines. A separate two-class queueing analysis examines capacity trade-offs; queue inputs remain synthetic. Public posting was disabled, but unlisted inspection URLs remained publicly retrievable. We measured neither audience conversion nor live telephone disruption. In a blinded rating of 32 new clips by 62 adult Arabic-speaking volunteers, 84% of all ratings were the top category and inter-rater agreement was near zero. Route differences were at most 0.16 scale points, and clips with documented visible defects were rated like the others, so we do not present these scores as evidence of realism. These findings show bounded production feasibility and measurement failures, but establish neither an overall engine ranking nor end-to-end attack feasibility. The work therefore characterizes an integrated, production-side path for a crowdsourced TDoS scenario, not a new telephony-level attack mechanism.

Journal of Cybersecurity and PrivacyVol. 6(6)
Islamic University of Madinah (SA)
Spam and Phishing Detection
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