Do risk committee size and board expertise reduce credit risk? Evidence from Indonesian commercial banks

Type of the article: Research ArticleAbstractPost-crisis banking reforms assume that formal risk-governance structures – board risk committees and expert directors – contain credit risk. This study examines whether risk committee size and board financial expertise are associated with credit risk in Indonesian commercial banks over 2020–2024. Using a hand-collected panel of 100 banks (500 bank-year observations) built exclusively from publicly disclosed annual reports and Basel III Pillar 3 disclosures, we regress the non-performing financing (NPF) ratio on one-period lagged governance variables. Because a Mundlak test rejects the orthogonality assumption underlying random effects (χ2(5) = 11.60, p = 0.041), inference rests on fixed-effects and correlated random-effects estimators, with random effects retained only as a comparator. Risk committee size is not associated with NPF in any specification (fixed effects: β = 0.0023, p = 0.22). Board financial expertise carries a positive, not the hypothesized negative, coefficient that never reaches the five per cent level within banks (fixed effects: β = 0.050, p = 0.066; log specification: β = 1.034, p = 0.082) and is insignificant once lagged NPF, conventional-only, no-foreign-branch, or high-CAR-exclusion specifications are considered. A formal interaction test does not establish a distinct Islamic-bank pattern (wild cluster bootstrap p = 0.31), and lead–lag tests detect no directional relationship. The study therefore finds no statistically robust within-bank association between annual changes in the two observable governance proxies and realized credit risk, while bank-level means of the regressors matter jointly, cautioning against reading cross-bank correlations as within-bank effects.

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Publication Details

Journal
Banks and Bank Systems
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.21511/bbs.21(4).2026.21
Primary Topic
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
Type
article
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article

Do risk committee size and board expertise reduce credit risk? Evidence from Indonesian commercial banks

Velly Anatasia, Ferry Novindra Idroes, Tannia Tannia
Banks and Bank Systems
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
article

Do risk committee size and board expertise reduce credit risk? Evidence from Indonesian commercial banks

Velly Anatasia, Ferry Novindra Idroes, Tannia Tannia
article en

Abstract

Type of the article: Research ArticleAbstractPost-crisis banking reforms assume that formal risk-governance structures – board risk committees and expert directors – contain credit risk. This study examines whether risk committee size and board financial expertise are associated with credit risk in Indonesian commercial banks over 2020–2024. Using a hand-collected panel of 100 banks (500 bank-year observations) built exclusively from publicly disclosed annual reports and Basel III Pillar 3 disclosures, we regress the non-performing financing (NPF) ratio on one-period lagged governance variables. Because a Mundlak test rejects the orthogonality assumption underlying random effects (χ2(5) = 11.60, p = 0.041), inference rests on fixed-effects and correlated random-effects estimators, with random effects retained only as a comparator. Risk committee size is not associated with NPF in any specification (fixed effects: β = 0.0023, p = 0.22). Board financial expertise carries a positive, not the hypothesized negative, coefficient that never reaches the five per cent level within banks (fixed effects: β = 0.050, p = 0.066; log specification: β = 1.034, p = 0.082) and is insignificant once lagged NPF, conventional-only, no-foreign-branch, or high-CAR-exclusion specifications are considered. A formal interaction test does not establish a distinct Islamic-bank pattern (wild cluster bootstrap p = 0.31), and lead–lag tests detect no directional relationship. The study therefore finds no statistically robust within-bank association between annual changes in the two observable governance proxies and realized credit risk, while bank-level means of the regressors matter jointly, cautioning against reading cross-bank correlations as within-bank effects.

Banks and Bank SystemsVol. 21(4)
University of Bunda Mulia (ID)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
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