Do Board Structures Curb ESG Controversies? Institutional Conditions as Moderators in a Cross-Country Analysis

This study examines whether three distinct board mechanisms—CEO board membership, nomination committee independence and board size—are associated with firms’ exposure to ESG controversies, and whether these associations depend on measured institutional conditions rather than on a developed/emerging market split. Using Refinitiv ESG data for 10,343 listed firms in 73 countries, we define controversy exposure as the complement of the Refinitiv ESG Controversies Score, so that higher values denote more and more severe controversies, and estimate regressions with country and data-vintage fixed effects and country-clustered standard errors, complemented by Tobit, logit, coefficient-stability and selection analyses. Once firm size is held constant, neither CEO board membership nor nomination committee independence is associated with controversy exposure on average, and the raw positive associations of all three board variables shrink by 60% or more, consistent with a visibility channel. Board size retains a positive association with the severity, but not the incidence, of controversies; this association is confined to countries with strong rule of law, regulatory quality and voice and accountability, and is sensitive to plausible unobserved selection. Nomination committee independence is associated with lower exposure only in common-law countries, consistent with complementarity between board monitoring and legal investor protection. A developed/emerging classification produces an apparent protective effect of CEO board membership in emerging markets that no measured institution reproduces. We also show that governance disclosure in ESG databases is missing non-randomly. The findings caution against treating board-structure indicators as portable measures of misconduct risk across institutional settings.

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Publication Details

Journal
Research Square
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11354792/v1
Primary Topic
Corporate Finance and Governance
Type
preprint
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preprint

Do Board Structures Curb ESG Controversies? Institutional Conditions as Moderators in a Cross-Country Analysis

Osman Issah, Tânia Menezes Montenegro, Andrews Salapki, Doe-Dartey Kwadzo Richard
5 links
Research Square
Corporate Finance and Governance
preprint

Do Board Structures Curb ESG Controversies? Institutional Conditions as Moderators in a Cross-Country Analysis

Osman Issah, Tânia Menezes Montenegro, Andrews Salapki, Doe-Dartey Kwadzo Richard
preprint en

Abstract

This study examines whether three distinct board mechanisms—CEO board membership, nomination committee independence and board size—are associated with firms’ exposure to ESG controversies, and whether these associations depend on measured institutional conditions rather than on a developed/emerging market split. Using Refinitiv ESG data for 10,343 listed firms in 73 countries, we define controversy exposure as the complement of the Refinitiv ESG Controversies Score, so that higher values denote more and more severe controversies, and estimate regressions with country and data-vintage fixed effects and country-clustered standard errors, complemented by Tobit, logit, coefficient-stability and selection analyses. Once firm size is held constant, neither CEO board membership nor nomination committee independence is associated with controversy exposure on average, and the raw positive associations of all three board variables shrink by 60% or more, consistent with a visibility channel. Board size retains a positive association with the severity, but not the incidence, of controversies; this association is confined to countries with strong rule of law, regulatory quality and voice and accountability, and is sensitive to plausible unobserved selection. Nomination committee independence is associated with lower exposure only in common-law countries, consistent with complementarity between board monitoring and legal investor protection. A developed/emerging classification produces an apparent protective effect of CEO board membership in emerging markets that no measured institution reproduces. We also show that governance disclosure in ESG databases is missing non-randomly. The findings caution against treating board-structure indicators as portable measures of misconduct risk across institutional settings.

Research Square
Simon Diedong Dombo University of Business and Integrated Development Studies (GH), University for Development Studies (GH), University of Minho (PT)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Corporate Finance and Governance
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