Cause-Tree Failure Analysis of Pressure Vessel Breakdowns; A Review of Root-Cause-Driven Maintenance Frameworks

Pressure vessels remain among the highest-consequence assets in refining, petrochemical, power generation, chemical processing, and cryogenic service. Their failures are rare in frequency but severe in outcome, which makes them poorly suited to purely statistical reliability treatment and strongly suited to causal reasoning. This paper reviews the state of cause-tree failure analysis as applied to pressure vessel breakdowns, and examines how the causal structures produced by such analysis are, or are not, converted into maintenance decisions. Four bodies of work are surveyed. The first is the family of deductive causal decomposition methods: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), event tree analysis, bow-tie modelling, causal factor charting, and the structured root-cause protocols descended from them. The second is the family of proactive maintenance frameworks: Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM), Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) under API RP 580 and API RP 581, condition-based and predictive maintenance, and fitness-for-service assessment under API 579-1/ASME FFS-1. The third is the emerging computational layer that connects the two, comprising Bayesian network mappings of fault trees, fuzzy and dynamic tree extensions, and digital-twin-enabled predictive analytics. The fourth is an adjacent applied literature of 201 sources, drawn on here as seed material and organised into thirty-two thematic clusters, covering non-destructive evaluation and corrosion risk assessment for process equipment, sensor-based condition monitoring and maintenance strategy migration, remote and standoff inspection, energy-autonomous wireless sensing, operational technology and enterprise security, aviation safety oversight and investigation practice, predictive analytics and anomaly detection, regulated facility lifecycle and design, procurement and supplier risk, audit and risk governance, algorithmic accountability, process discipline, and the organisational causation of industrial incidents. The central finding of this review is that the first two bodies of practice remain weakly coupled. Cause trees are typically built after a failure, for the purpose of incident reporting, while maintenance intervals are typically set before failure, from generic damage-rate assumptions and codemandated periodicities. The causal knowledge produced in the first activity rarely reaches the interval-setting logic of the second in a formal, auditable way. A worked quantitative example is presented showing that under a plausible pressure vessel fault tree, a maintenance investment directed by importance measures reduces top-event probability by roughly 78 percent, whereas an equally costly investment directed by convention and habit reduces it by under 2 percent. The paper proposes a five-layer Root-Cause-Driven Maintenance (RCDM) architecture to close this gap, identifies ten research gaps, and sets out directions for integrating causal models with live asset integrity data.

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Publication Details

Journal
RESEARCH JOURNAL OF PURE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.56201/rjpst.v7.no6.2024.pg120.174
Primary Topic
Risk and Safety Analysis
Type
article
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article

Cause-Tree Failure Analysis of Pressure Vessel Breakdowns; A Review of Root-Cause-Driven Maintenance Frameworks

Paul Chibuike Obetta
RESEARCH JOURNAL OF PURE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Risk and Safety Analysis
article

Cause-Tree Failure Analysis of Pressure Vessel Breakdowns; A Review of Root-Cause-Driven Maintenance Frameworks

Paul Chibuike Obetta
article en

Abstract

Pressure vessels remain among the highest-consequence assets in refining, petrochemical, power generation, chemical processing, and cryogenic service. Their failures are rare in frequency but severe in outcome, which makes them poorly suited to purely statistical reliability treatment and strongly suited to causal reasoning. This paper reviews the state of cause-tree failure analysis as applied to pressure vessel breakdowns, and examines how the causal structures produced by such analysis are, or are not, converted into maintenance decisions. Four bodies of work are surveyed. The first is the family of deductive causal decomposition methods: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), event tree analysis, bow-tie modelling, causal factor charting, and the structured root-cause protocols descended from them. The second is the family of proactive maintenance frameworks: Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM), Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) under API RP 580 and API RP 581, condition-based and predictive maintenance, and fitness-for-service assessment under API 579-1/ASME FFS-1. The third is the emerging computational layer that connects the two, comprising Bayesian network mappings of fault trees, fuzzy and dynamic tree extensions, and digital-twin-enabled predictive analytics. The fourth is an adjacent applied literature of 201 sources, drawn on here as seed material and organised into thirty-two thematic clusters, covering non-destructive evaluation and corrosion risk assessment for process equipment, sensor-based condition monitoring and maintenance strategy migration, remote and standoff inspection, energy-autonomous wireless sensing, operational technology and enterprise security, aviation safety oversight and investigation practice, predictive analytics and anomaly detection, regulated facility lifecycle and design, procurement and supplier risk, audit and risk governance, algorithmic accountability, process discipline, and the organisational causation of industrial incidents. The central finding of this review is that the first two bodies of practice remain weakly coupled. Cause trees are typically built after a failure, for the purpose of incident reporting, while maintenance intervals are typically set before failure, from generic damage-rate assumptions and codemandated periodicities. The causal knowledge produced in the first activity rarely reaches the interval-setting logic of the second in a formal, auditable way. A worked quantitative example is presented showing that under a plausible pressure vessel fault tree, a maintenance investment directed by importance measures reduces top-event probability by roughly 78 percent, whereas an equally costly investment directed by convention and habit reduces it by under 2 percent. The paper proposes a five-layer Root-Cause-Driven Maintenance (RCDM) architecture to close this gap, identifies ten research gaps, and sets out directions for integrating causal models with live asset integrity data.

RESEARCH JOURNAL OF PURE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Risk and Safety Analysis
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