Italian Capital Markets Reform Through the Lens of Regulatory Competitiveness

The article examines the recent Italian capital markets reform through the notion of regulatory competitiveness, understood as the capacity of a legal system to make capital markets more attractive without weakening the safeguards on which market confidence depends. It argues that the reform should not be understood as a deregulatory intervention, but as an attempt to recalibrate the relationship between market attractiveness, issuer flexibility and investor protection. The analysis shows that the reform operates along two complementary lines: first, by reshaping the issuer-market relationship through greater procedural predictability, reduced regulatory burdens and wider statutory autonomy for newly listed companies; secondly, by treating the internal organization of the company as a market safeguard, with particular regard to governance, board information flows, internal controls and risk management. The article contends that the reform’s main contribution lies in moving from a merely protective model of regulation to a more selective and functional one. It concludes, however, that selective simplification can improve the accessibility of the market only if it does not turn issuer flexibility into weaker governance, reduced transparency or diminished organizational credibility

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Publication Details

Journal
European Company Law
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.54648/eucl2026016
Primary Topic
Finance, Markets, and Regulation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Italian Capital Markets Reform Through the Lens of Regulatory Competitiveness

Luca Sabelli
1 links
European Company Law
Finance, Markets, and Regulation
article

Italian Capital Markets Reform Through the Lens of Regulatory Competitiveness

Luca Sabelli
article en

Abstract

The article examines the recent Italian capital markets reform through the notion of regulatory competitiveness, understood as the capacity of a legal system to make capital markets more attractive without weakening the safeguards on which market confidence depends. It argues that the reform should not be understood as a deregulatory intervention, but as an attempt to recalibrate the relationship between market attractiveness, issuer flexibility and investor protection. The analysis shows that the reform operates along two complementary lines: first, by reshaping the issuer-market relationship through greater procedural predictability, reduced regulatory burdens and wider statutory autonomy for newly listed companies; secondly, by treating the internal organization of the company as a market safeguard, with particular regard to governance, board information flows, internal controls and risk management. The article contends that the reform’s main contribution lies in moving from a merely protective model of regulation to a more selective and functional one. It concludes, however, that selective simplification can improve the accessibility of the market only if it does not turn issuer flexibility into weaker governance, reduced transparency or diminished organizational credibility

European Company LawVol. 23(Issue 6)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Finance, Markets, and Regulation
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