Adaptive LLM-Driven Honeypots vs. LLM-Driven Attackers: Does Narrative Coherence Improve Deception?

Large Language Models (LLMs) enable honeypots to generate responses and deceptive artefacts on demand, yet existing approaches evaluate generated content one reply at a time and leave open whether artefacts that jointly describe a coherent event retain an attacker better than unrelated ones. This question becomes pressing as autonomous LLM-driven offensive agents emerge as realistic adversaries. This paper proposes narrative deception, a reactive strategy in which the defender maps each observed attacker command to a MITRE ATT&CK technique, selects a compatible scenario from a curated catalogue based on MITRE Engage, and deploys mutually referential artefacts (files, processes, services, and logs) on an emulated Ubuntu host while the intrusion is under way. An LLM-powered defender and an autonomous LLM attacker interact through a real SSH session, and the attacker's termination policy distinguishes abandonment due to suspected deception from abandonment due to loss of interest. A campaign of 1,150 sessions compares four conditions of increasing sophistication (Static, Same-TTP, Multi-TTP, and Chain) across four open-weight attacker models, four defender models, and three attacker skill levels. Engagement increases significantly at every step. With the same artefact budget per reaction, coherent scenarios raise the median session length of advanced attackers from 40 to 165 commands and reduce their abandonment from 86% to 52%. The effect grows with attacker skill, holds across all sixteen model pairs, and comes at comparable inference cost. Nearly all sessions ended through loss of interest rather than detection, which suggests that deception should sustain meaningful findings, not only emulator fidelity.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.22589
Primary Topic
Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Type
preprint
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
preprint

Adaptive LLM-Driven Honeypots vs. LLM-Driven Attackers: Does Narrative Coherence Improve Deception?

Pantaleone Nespoli, Dario Maddaloni, Pedro Beltran Lopez, Manuel Gil Pérez et al.
arXiv (Cornell University)
Network Security and Intrusion Detection
preprint

Adaptive LLM-Driven Honeypots vs. LLM-Driven Attackers: Does Narrative Coherence Improve Deception?

Pantaleone Nespoli, Dario Maddaloni, Pedro Beltran Lopez, Manuel Gil Pérez, Raul Gonzalez Jimenez
preprint en

Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) enable honeypots to generate responses and deceptive artefacts on demand, yet existing approaches evaluate generated content one reply at a time and leave open whether artefacts that jointly describe a coherent event retain an attacker better than unrelated ones. This question becomes pressing as autonomous LLM-driven offensive agents emerge as realistic adversaries. This paper proposes narrative deception, a reactive strategy in which the defender maps each observed attacker command to a MITRE ATT&CK technique, selects a compatible scenario from a curated catalogue based on MITRE Engage, and deploys mutually referential artefacts (files, processes, services, and logs) on an emulated Ubuntu host while the intrusion is under way. An LLM-powered defender and an autonomous LLM attacker interact through a real SSH session, and the attacker's termination policy distinguishes abandonment due to suspected deception from abandonment due to loss of interest. A campaign of 1,150 sessions compares four conditions of increasing sophistication (Static, Same-TTP, Multi-TTP, and Chain) across four open-weight attacker models, four defender models, and three attacker skill levels. Engagement increases significantly at every step. With the same artefact budget per reaction, coherent scenarios raise the median session length of advanced attackers from 40 to 165 commands and reduce their abandonment from 86% to 52%. The effect grows with attacker skill, holds across all sixteen model pairs, and comes at comparable inference cost. Nearly all sessions ended through loss of interest rather than detection, which suggests that deception should sustain meaningful findings, not only emulator fidelity.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Network Security and Intrusion Detection
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Laika access coming soon