Causa Sui and Creationism in Spinoza

This paper argues that Spinoza's definition of causa sui at the opening of the Ethics is a deliberate rejection of creationism. While most interpretations focus on whether causa sui expresses formal or efficient causation, they overlook the theological force of Spinoza's opening move. I suggest that the first definition—‘that whose essence involves existence’—mirrors and inverts Genesis 1:1, where Scripture begins with divine creation; Spinoza begins with self‐causation, replacing will and temporal beginning with necessity and eternity. Tracing the role of causa sui through Part I of the Ethics and culminating in the Appendix, I show that Spinoza systematically eliminates the conceptual basis of creation. If God is self‐caused, divine causation cannot be temporal or purposive. The critique of teleology and anthropomorphism follows directly from this shift. Reading causa sui against Genesis thus reveals a systematic connection between Spinoza's rejection of creationism and his critique of the theological foundations of morality, establishing the metaphysical conditions for the naturalistic ethics developed in the subsequent parts of the Ethics .

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Theoria
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.70136
Primary Topic
Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
article

Causa Sui and Creationism in Spinoza

Noa Lahav Ayalon
Theoria
Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought
article

Causa Sui and Creationism in Spinoza

Noa Lahav Ayalon
article en

Abstract

This paper argues that Spinoza's definition of causa sui at the opening of the Ethics is a deliberate rejection of creationism. While most interpretations focus on whether causa sui expresses formal or efficient causation, they overlook the theological force of Spinoza's opening move. I suggest that the first definition—‘that whose essence involves existence’—mirrors and inverts Genesis 1:1, where Scripture begins with divine creation; Spinoza begins with self‐causation, replacing will and temporal beginning with necessity and eternity. Tracing the role of causa sui through Part I of the Ethics and culminating in the Appendix, I show that Spinoza systematically eliminates the conceptual basis of creation. If God is self‐caused, divine causation cannot be temporal or purposive. The critique of teleology and anthropomorphism follows directly from this shift. Reading causa sui against Genesis thus reveals a systematic connection between Spinoza's rejection of creationism and his critique of the theological foundations of morality, establishing the metaphysical conditions for the naturalistic ethics developed in the subsequent parts of the Ethics .

Theoria
Technion – Israel Institute of Technology (IL)
Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Laika access coming soon