Sanction or strategy? Electoral competition and retaliatory use of no-confidence votes

No-confidence votes (NCVs) provide a sanctioning mechanism to hold democratically elected politicians accountable. However, national politicians can weaponize NCVs to target potential local rivals to deter future electoral challenge. This perverse form of accountability can undermine the quality of democratic competition, thus obviating the core goal of NCVs. Empirically, I evaluate this argument in the context of a developing democracy. During the 2016 presidential campaign in Benin, mayors who did not endorse the same presidential candidate as the MP from their district were two-thirds more likely to face an NCV. MPs who initiated NCVs against politically incongruent mayors were more likely to win re-election. Additional evidence shows that targeted mayors were less likely to obtain party nominations, while those who regained ballot access disproportionately switched political organizations. This evidence leverages administrative and electoral records. The findings show how democratic institutions and candidate-selection processes can become tools for managing intra-elite competition.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy
Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1108/jpipe-08-2026-0034
Primary Topic
Electoral Systems and Political Participation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Sanction or strategy? Electoral competition and retaliatory use of no-confidence votes

Lazare Kovo
2 links
Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy
Electoral Systems and Political Participation
article

Sanction or strategy? Electoral competition and retaliatory use of no-confidence votes

Lazare Kovo
article en

Abstract

No-confidence votes (NCVs) provide a sanctioning mechanism to hold democratically elected politicians accountable. However, national politicians can weaponize NCVs to target potential local rivals to deter future electoral challenge. This perverse form of accountability can undermine the quality of democratic competition, thus obviating the core goal of NCVs. Empirically, I evaluate this argument in the context of a developing democracy. During the 2016 presidential campaign in Benin, mayors who did not endorse the same presidential candidate as the MP from their district were two-thirds more likely to face an NCV. MPs who initiated NCVs against politically incongruent mayors were more likely to win re-election. Additional evidence shows that targeted mayors were less likely to obtain party nominations, while those who regained ballot access disproportionately switched political organizations. This evidence leverages administrative and electoral records. The findings show how democratic institutions and candidate-selection processes can become tools for managing intra-elite competition.

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy
Emory University (US)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Electoral Systems and Political Participation
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