The Numerical Delegation of Judgment. Aggregation, Reliance, and Evaluative Authority
Scores, rankings, reviews, and indexes aggregate individual judgments and return them in quantitative form. Their use can offer relevant information, but it can also modify the function of individual judgment. This essay analyzes the transition through which an aggregated result ceases to be used merely as information and comes to determine, wholly or in part, the subject's evaluation. I propose to call this transition numerical delegation of judgment: the transfer of an evaluative function to the numerical representation of other people's judgments. The distinction between aggregated information and delegation allows the justification of reliance, and the possible excess of authority—the situation in which the function attributed to the number exceeds what the measure, the aggregation process, or the procedure can justify—to be examined separately. Responsiveness to reasons makes it possible to recognize delegation; proportionality and revisability allow its justification to be assessed. The contribution consists in isolating this relation between the subject and the numerical representation of other people's judgments, distinguishing it from social influence and from the more general authority of metrics. The essay introduces interpretive feedback, through which the aggregated result modifies the reading of the judgments that produced it, and examines applications of the distinction to dynamics of reception, self-evaluation, and digital visibility.
Authors
- Andrea Audino (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0003-3819-2140)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-18
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24355031
- Primary Topic
- Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Type
- preprint