A Game-Theoretic Strategic Pricing Framework for Competing EV Fast-Charging Operators: An Illustrative Application Motivated by the Istanbul–Ankara Corridor

This study developed a game-theoretic pricing framework for two competing electric vehicle (EV) fast-charging operators by integrating a multinomial logit (MNL) station-choice model with an M/M/4 queue at each station. Each station comprises four parallel chargers, each with a service rate of 2 EV/h, resulting in an aggregate service capacity of 8 EV/h. For each candidate price pair, a damped fixed-point algorithm jointly determines station-choice probabilities, arrival rates, and expected queueing delays. Operators subsequently update their prices through discrete best responses, while potential equilibrium outcomes are evaluated using unilateral-deviation regret. In the illustrative high-demand scenario with a total potential arrival rate of 6 EV/h, the representative base-grid pricing outcome is USD 0.45/kWh for Operator A and USD 0.42/kWh for Operator B. The corresponding arrival rates are 3.080 and 2.920 EV/h, and the expected queueing waits are 0.985 and 0.811 min, respectively. The demand-weighted average waiting time decreases from 1.030 min under fixed pricing to 0.900 min under strategic pricing. The combined daily gross contribution increases from USD 1404 to approximately USD 3082. Additional analyses examine demand levels from 1 to 8 EV/h, sensitivity to the MNL price coefficient, and the inclusion of an outside option. Exhaustive searches identify one candidate on the USD 0.01/kWh grid and two candidates on the finer USD 0.005/kWh grid; therefore, equilibrium uniqueness is not established. Since demand, travel distances, choice coefficients, and procurement costs are illustrative assumptions and the payoff excludes capital and other operating costs, the findings represent numerical insights under the specified assumptions rather than empirically validated corridor outcomes.

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Publication Details

Journal
Energies
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/en19225573
Primary Topic
Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure
Type
article
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article

A Game-Theoretic Strategic Pricing Framework for Competing EV Fast-Charging Operators: An Illustrative Application Motivated by the Istanbul–Ankara Corridor

Hasan Hüseyin Çoban, Wojciech Lewicki, Panagiotis Michailidis
2 links
Energies
Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure
article

A Game-Theoretic Strategic Pricing Framework for Competing EV Fast-Charging Operators: An Illustrative Application Motivated by the Istanbul–Ankara Corridor

Hasan Hüseyin Çoban, Wojciech Lewicki, Panagiotis Michailidis
article en

Abstract

This study developed a game-theoretic pricing framework for two competing electric vehicle (EV) fast-charging operators by integrating a multinomial logit (MNL) station-choice model with an M/M/4 queue at each station. Each station comprises four parallel chargers, each with a service rate of 2 EV/h, resulting in an aggregate service capacity of 8 EV/h. For each candidate price pair, a damped fixed-point algorithm jointly determines station-choice probabilities, arrival rates, and expected queueing delays. Operators subsequently update their prices through discrete best responses, while potential equilibrium outcomes are evaluated using unilateral-deviation regret. In the illustrative high-demand scenario with a total potential arrival rate of 6 EV/h, the representative base-grid pricing outcome is USD 0.45/kWh for Operator A and USD 0.42/kWh for Operator B. The corresponding arrival rates are 3.080 and 2.920 EV/h, and the expected queueing waits are 0.985 and 0.811 min, respectively. The demand-weighted average waiting time decreases from 1.030 min under fixed pricing to 0.900 min under strategic pricing. The combined daily gross contribution increases from USD 1404 to approximately USD 3082. Additional analyses examine demand levels from 1 to 8 EV/h, sensitivity to the MNL price coefficient, and the inclusion of an outside option. Exhaustive searches identify one candidate on the USD 0.01/kWh grid and two candidates on the finer USD 0.005/kWh grid; therefore, equilibrium uniqueness is not established. Since demand, travel distances, choice coefficients, and procurement costs are illustrative assumptions and the payoff excludes capital and other operating costs, the findings represent numerical insights under the specified assumptions rather than empirically validated corridor outcomes.

EnergiesVol. 19(22)
Democritus University of Thrace (GR), West Pomeranian University of Technology in Szczecin (PL), Bartin University (TR), Information Technologies Institute (GR), Centre for Research and Technology Hellas (GR)
Industry, innovation and infrastructure
Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure
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