Contrary to Skidelsky (2026, pp.14-16), Keynes was a very powerful, mathematical logician

It was impossible for R. Skidelsky to understand Keynes’s logical theory of probability, as presented in Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, because he had no training in formal, symbolic logic, mathematics, probability or statistics. He was ignorant of the type of formal, symbolic, mathematical logic that was the foundation for all five Parts of the A Treatise on Probability, which was Boole’s relational, propositional (statement, sentential) logic and a first order, predicate logic that Keynes used throughout his A treatise on Probability. Skidelsky, much like G L S Shackle, was unable to read even the basic, introductory chapters I and II of the A Treatise on Probability, which are mainly summaries made by Keynes of Boole’s earlier work in chapter I of The Laws of Thought (1854) on relational, propositional logic and argument forms. Given the great technical, mathematical deficiencies in Skidelsky’s training, the obvious solution would have been for Skidelsky to seek expert technical advice. Unfortunately, at no time in his life did Skidelsky attempt to obtain any help from mathematicians or logicians, who could have explained to Skidelsky what it was that Keynes was doing in his A Treatise on Probability-building on the foundations provided by Boole in his The Laws of Thought. Instead of seeking the advice of technically trained experts, Skidelsky substituted the insinuations, musings, ruminations, canards and ravings of F P Ramsey, J. Robinson, R Harrod and G L S Shackle, none of whom understood what Keynes was doing in his A Treatise on Probability, which was to further develop the first technically advanced, logical theory of probability as presented by George Boole in his 1854 The Laws of Thought.

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Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24333602
Primary Topic
Literary, Cultural, Historical Analysis
Type
article
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article

Contrary to Skidelsky (2026, pp.14-16), Keynes was a very powerful, mathematical logician

Michael Emmett Brady
2 links
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Literary, Cultural, Historical Analysis
article

Contrary to Skidelsky (2026, pp.14-16), Keynes was a very powerful, mathematical logician

Michael Emmett Brady
article en

Abstract

It was impossible for R. Skidelsky to understand Keynes’s logical theory of probability, as presented in Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, because he had no training in formal, symbolic logic, mathematics, probability or statistics. He was ignorant of the type of formal, symbolic, mathematical logic that was the foundation for all five Parts of the A Treatise on Probability, which was Boole’s relational, propositional (statement, sentential) logic and a first order, predicate logic that Keynes used throughout his A treatise on Probability. Skidelsky, much like G L S Shackle, was unable to read even the basic, introductory chapters I and II of the A Treatise on Probability, which are mainly summaries made by Keynes of Boole’s earlier work in chapter I of The Laws of Thought (1854) on relational, propositional logic and argument forms. Given the great technical, mathematical deficiencies in Skidelsky’s training, the obvious solution would have been for Skidelsky to seek expert technical advice. Unfortunately, at no time in his life did Skidelsky attempt to obtain any help from mathematicians or logicians, who could have explained to Skidelsky what it was that Keynes was doing in his A Treatise on Probability-building on the foundations provided by Boole in his The Laws of Thought. Instead of seeking the advice of technically trained experts, Skidelsky substituted the insinuations, musings, ruminations, canards and ravings of F P Ramsey, J. Robinson, R Harrod and G L S Shackle, none of whom understood what Keynes was doing in his A Treatise on Probability, which was to further develop the first technically advanced, logical theory of probability as presented by George Boole in his 1854 The Laws of Thought.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
California State University, Dominguez Hills (US)
Literary, Cultural, Historical Analysis
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