CONSTRAINT: the feasible-set axis of control

The carrier-layer model of control in this series tracks instruments that move an actor's objective ($theta$) across its declared, dispositional, and operative layers. A second, equally large family of control systems does something different: it never touches the objective at all. Prisons, borders, sanctions, property regimes, antitrust decrees, agent confinement, tool-permission surfaces, and veto points do not persuade; they deform the {feasible set} $F$ --- what the actor can do, whatever it wants. This paper adds $F$ as a second axis of the control model, shows that the canonical instrument taxonomies (carrots/sticks/sermons; NATO) are structurally blind to the axis they conflate, and unifies three literatures that each hold a fragment of the idea: Sen's capability approach ($F$ at the person), constrained-MDP safety ($F$ at the policy), and access control ($F$ at the surface). The unification matters because it exposes the question the other papers in the series left open: {which} feasible-set deformations are legitimate. The answer the framework supplies --- the deployer's own $theta$, checked against whether the removed actions would have harmed the cared set --- distinguishes floors that protect life capacity from walls that protect incumbents, using the same instrument grammar on both sides.

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Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24333702
Primary Topic
Public Policy and Administration Research
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

CONSTRAINT: the feasible-set axis of control

Thomas Ryan Price
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Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Public Policy and Administration Research
article

CONSTRAINT: the feasible-set axis of control

Thomas Ryan Price
article en

Abstract

The carrier-layer model of control in this series tracks instruments that move an actor's objective ($theta$) across its declared, dispositional, and operative layers. A second, equally large family of control systems does something different: it never touches the objective at all. Prisons, borders, sanctions, property regimes, antitrust decrees, agent confinement, tool-permission surfaces, and veto points do not persuade; they deform the {feasible set} $F$ --- what the actor can do, whatever it wants. This paper adds $F$ as a second axis of the control model, shows that the canonical instrument taxonomies (carrots/sticks/sermons; NATO) are structurally blind to the axis they conflate, and unifies three literatures that each hold a fragment of the idea: Sen's capability approach ($F$ at the person), constrained-MDP safety ($F$ at the policy), and access control ($F$ at the surface). The unification matters because it exposes the question the other papers in the series left open: {which} feasible-set deformations are legitimate. The answer the framework supplies --- the deployer's own $theta$, checked against whether the removed actions would have harmed the cared set --- distinguishes floors that protect life capacity from walls that protect incumbents, using the same instrument grammar on both sides.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Public Policy and Administration Research
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