Foundational Asymmetry and the Federal Consolidation Problem: Somalia in Comparative Perspective

Federal theory usually assumes that a center exists before the units it decentralizes to, or that sovereign units create a center together at one founding moment. A growing number of post-conflict federations follow neither path: member states are built first, and a central government is rebuilt later and then seeks authority over them. This article theorizes these latecomer-center federations. It argues that their stability depends less on how much authority the center holds than on whether central authority grows through shared-rule institutions. Three concepts specify the argument. Centralization without federal consolidation is the expansion of effective central authority before the procedures that define and constrain it are settled. Foundational asymmetry is the unequal institutional inheritance that units bring into a formally symmetric federation. Constituent compact consciousness is a unit's historically grounded claim to have co-authored the compact and therefore to take part in revising it. From these concepts the article derives four general propositions and a typology that places latecomer-center federations alongside coming-together and holding-together federations. It traces the mechanism in Somalia (1998–2025), where Puntland predates the federal government by fourteen years and the Provisional Constitution itself encodes its prior status, and then compares four latecomer-center federations: Iraqi Kurdistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sudan before 2011 and Ethiopia. The comparison yields a second finding. Resistance takes a different form at each level of inherited capacity: units with materially established institutions withhold recognition and threaten exit, while units whose capacity rests on a founding claim and on recognition by the center escalate to violence when recognition is withdrawn. The framework explains why formally identical centralizing measures provoke unequal resistance, why procedural disputes escalate into disputes over the federation's authority, and why building a strong center and building a federation are distinct tasks. The comparison also shows that the form resistance takes depends on what the older unit holds: institutions it can withhold, a territory it can leave, or an army it can use.

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Publication Details

Journal
SocArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/vy72t_v1
Primary Topic
Political Systems and Governance
Type
preprint
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preprint

Foundational Asymmetry and the Federal Consolidation Problem: Somalia in Comparative Perspective

Ismail H. Warsame
1 links
SocArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Political Systems and Governance
preprint

Foundational Asymmetry and the Federal Consolidation Problem: Somalia in Comparative Perspective

Ismail H. Warsame
preprint en

Abstract

Federal theory usually assumes that a center exists before the units it decentralizes to, or that sovereign units create a center together at one founding moment. A growing number of post-conflict federations follow neither path: member states are built first, and a central government is rebuilt later and then seeks authority over them. This article theorizes these latecomer-center federations. It argues that their stability depends less on how much authority the center holds than on whether central authority grows through shared-rule institutions. Three concepts specify the argument. Centralization without federal consolidation is the expansion of effective central authority before the procedures that define and constrain it are settled. Foundational asymmetry is the unequal institutional inheritance that units bring into a formally symmetric federation. Constituent compact consciousness is a unit's historically grounded claim to have co-authored the compact and therefore to take part in revising it. From these concepts the article derives four general propositions and a typology that places latecomer-center federations alongside coming-together and holding-together federations. It traces the mechanism in Somalia (1998–2025), where Puntland predates the federal government by fourteen years and the Provisional Constitution itself encodes its prior status, and then compares four latecomer-center federations: Iraqi Kurdistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sudan before 2011 and Ethiopia. The comparison yields a second finding. Resistance takes a different form at each level of inherited capacity: units with materially established institutions withhold recognition and threaten exit, while units whose capacity rests on a founding claim and on recognition by the center escalate to violence when recognition is withdrawn. The framework explains why formally identical centralizing measures provoke unequal resistance, why procedural disputes escalate into disputes over the federation's authority, and why building a strong center and building a federation are distinct tasks. The comparison also shows that the form resistance takes depends on what the older unit holds: institutions it can withhold, a territory it can leave, or an army it can use.

SocArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Political Systems and Governance
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