How do incentive and constraint mechanisms promote deleveraging in steel enterprises against the backdrop of capacity reduction? An evolutionary game network analysis

As a critical pathway for high-energy-consumption industries to achieve green transition and sustainable development, deleveraging in steel enterprises plays a significant role in supporting industrial restructuring and overcapacity reduction. Current research, however, pays insufficient attention to how policy instruments shape corporate strategic decision-making in this process. Against this backdrop, this study employs evolutionary game theory and constructs small-world and scale-free network models to simulate the strategic interactions and learning mechanisms among steel enterprises. The model treats the ultra-low-emission retrofit state as a fixed firm attribute, allows neighboring leverage strategies to enter conditional payoffs through the local DLEV share, and applies asynchronous Fermi imitation. Through systematic numerical simulations, the study examines the dynamic impacts of individual and combined policies-including fiscal subsidies, financing support, liability-excess penalties, and credit sanctions-on the diffusion of deleveraging strategies. Multi-scenario comparisons reveal that: (1) without policy intervention, DLEV contracts and UDLEV becomes dominant, whereas incentive-constraint packages generate broader diffusion than single mechanisms; among the evaluated packages, fiscal subsidies combined with liability-excess penalties perform best, followed by fiscal subsidies combined with credit sanctions; (2) among the single instruments, fiscal subsidies exert the strongest effect and liability-excess penalties rank second, while financing support and credit sanctions are insufficient to trigger broad diffusion when used alone within the calibrated ranges; and (3) network topology shapes the transmission path of policy effects: clustered WS neighborhoods support repeated local reinforcement, whereas BA hubs may suppress DLEV under weak intervention but accelerate network-wide cascades once influential enterprises switch strategy. These model-based findings provide a quantitative reference for designing coordinated and topology-sensitive policy packages to facilitate deleveraging and the green transition of energy-intensive industries.

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Publication Details

Journal
PLoS ONE
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0341986
Primary Topic
Climate Change Policy and Economics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

How do incentive and constraint mechanisms promote deleveraging in steel enterprises against the backdrop of capacity reduction? An evolutionary game network analysis

Jiahui Li, Jiayu Liu, Jingming Li, Ran Shu
3 links
PLoS ONE
Climate Change Policy and Economics
article

How do incentive and constraint mechanisms promote deleveraging in steel enterprises against the backdrop of capacity reduction? An evolutionary game network analysis

Jiahui Li, Jiayu Liu, Jingming Li, Ran Shu
article en

Abstract

As a critical pathway for high-energy-consumption industries to achieve green transition and sustainable development, deleveraging in steel enterprises plays a significant role in supporting industrial restructuring and overcapacity reduction. Current research, however, pays insufficient attention to how policy instruments shape corporate strategic decision-making in this process. Against this backdrop, this study employs evolutionary game theory and constructs small-world and scale-free network models to simulate the strategic interactions and learning mechanisms among steel enterprises. The model treats the ultra-low-emission retrofit state as a fixed firm attribute, allows neighboring leverage strategies to enter conditional payoffs through the local DLEV share, and applies asynchronous Fermi imitation. Through systematic numerical simulations, the study examines the dynamic impacts of individual and combined policies-including fiscal subsidies, financing support, liability-excess penalties, and credit sanctions-on the diffusion of deleveraging strategies. Multi-scenario comparisons reveal that: (1) without policy intervention, DLEV contracts and UDLEV becomes dominant, whereas incentive-constraint packages generate broader diffusion than single mechanisms; among the evaluated packages, fiscal subsidies combined with liability-excess penalties perform best, followed by fiscal subsidies combined with credit sanctions; (2) among the single instruments, fiscal subsidies exert the strongest effect and liability-excess penalties rank second, while financing support and credit sanctions are insufficient to trigger broad diffusion when used alone within the calibrated ranges; and (3) network topology shapes the transmission path of policy effects: clustered WS neighborhoods support repeated local reinforcement, whereas BA hubs may suppress DLEV under weak intervention but accelerate network-wide cascades once influential enterprises switch strategy. These model-based findings provide a quantitative reference for designing coordinated and topology-sensitive policy packages to facilitate deleveraging and the green transition of energy-intensive industries.

PLoS ONEVol. 21(11)
Wuhan University of Science and Technology (CN)
National Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences, National Social Science Fund of China
Industry, innovation and infrastructure, Decent work and economic growth
Climate Change Policy and Economics
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