A Reissuable Social Security Credential Framework to Prevent Identity Theft
The United States Social Security number (SSN) is used both as a permanent identifier for taxand payroll records and as a secret that proves identity when credit is opened. It cannot doboth: an identifier must be disclosed widely, and a secret that has been disclosed cannot bechanged. This paper specifies a backward-compatible framework that separates the two roleswithout altering the SSN or the systems that store it. The Social Security Administration (SSA)issues each number holder a plastic chip card containing a private signing key that never leavesthe chip and is unlocked by a four-digit PIN that SSA assigns and mails separately; the carddisplays no SSN and no secret. To open credit, the holder’s chip signs a request that the lenderhas itself signed, naming the lender, the product and an amount ceiling, so that approval isbound to one application. Credit bureaus verify the signature against an SSA-issued certificateand a published status list, so SSA is not contacted during a transaction and does not learnwhere people apply for credit. Two alternatives produce an approval attested by SSA instead ofsigned by the chip: a web session secured by a passkey, and, for holders who prefer paper and paya fee, a path using a paper record card that carries a reissuable 16-digit Credential Number anda 12-character card secret, entered in SSA’s application with the PIN and completed by photoidentification in person, by a one-time code sent to the holder’s telephone, or after a waitingperiod announced to the holder by mail. The two classes of approval are labeled and neverconflated. Status is kept separately for the person and for each credential, so that a freeze blocksevery path while the loss of one credential affects only that credential. We specify issuance, loss,recovery and freeze procedures consistent with NIST SP 800-63-4, an origination receipt thatlimits each approval to one account, a statutory outline with a conditional safe harbor, a fundingmodel and a transition plan. The design addresses new-account and synthetic identity fraud. Itdoes not by itself address account takeover, tax-refund fraud or employment fraud, and it hasnot been prototyped or formally verified.
Authors
- George Davey (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-8396-4976)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-18
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24354434
- Primary Topic
- User Authentication and Security Systems
- Type
- preprint