Evolving cognitive environment drives critical transitions in voluntary vaccination dynamics

Why do voluntary vaccination programs remain unstable despite proven collective benefits? Existing game-theoretic models assume that populations employ uniform decision frameworks with fixed cognitive environments. We develop a co-evolutionary framework coupling seasonal epidemic dynamics with vaccination decisions guided by two competing cognitive systems: socially oriented game cognition versus self-interested vaccine cognition. Their dynamic interplay generates bistable equilibria, hysteresis and critical phase transitions entirely absent from cognitively homogeneous models. Through systematic parameter space exploration across transmission rates, recovery rates, vaccine efficacy and vaccination costs, we establish that game structure proves decisive for population outcomes. Cooperation-favouring dilemmas sustain high coverage below sharp cost thresholds, whereas defection-favouring structures trap populations in persistent low-coverage states. Critical cost thresholds exhibit saturation: beyond moderate vaccine efficacy, further improvements yield diminishing behavioural returns. Cognitive composition evolves as a slow variable amplifying path dependence, wherein initial coverage disproportionately determines long-term equilibria through self-reinforcing cascades. These dynamics expose fundamental nonlinearities in intervention design. Subsidies exhibit threshold effects near critical boundaries; communication strategies must target dominant cognitive frameworks rather than disease severity, and early-stage campaigns possess outsized importance. This coupled dynamics approach extends naturally to other voluntary health behaviours where individual rationality conflicts with collective welfare.

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Publication Details

Journal
Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2025.3061
Primary Topic
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Type
article
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article

Evolving cognitive environment drives critical transitions in voluntary vaccination dynamics

Hsuan‐Wei Lee, Mao-Chieh Chin
1 links
Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
article

Evolving cognitive environment drives critical transitions in voluntary vaccination dynamics

Hsuan‐Wei Lee, Mao-Chieh Chin
article en

Abstract

Why do voluntary vaccination programs remain unstable despite proven collective benefits? Existing game-theoretic models assume that populations employ uniform decision frameworks with fixed cognitive environments. We develop a co-evolutionary framework coupling seasonal epidemic dynamics with vaccination decisions guided by two competing cognitive systems: socially oriented game cognition versus self-interested vaccine cognition. Their dynamic interplay generates bistable equilibria, hysteresis and critical phase transitions entirely absent from cognitively homogeneous models. Through systematic parameter space exploration across transmission rates, recovery rates, vaccine efficacy and vaccination costs, we establish that game structure proves decisive for population outcomes. Cooperation-favouring dilemmas sustain high coverage below sharp cost thresholds, whereas defection-favouring structures trap populations in persistent low-coverage states. Critical cost thresholds exhibit saturation: beyond moderate vaccine efficacy, further improvements yield diminishing behavioural returns. Cognitive composition evolves as a slow variable amplifying path dependence, wherein initial coverage disproportionately determines long-term equilibria through self-reinforcing cascades. These dynamics expose fundamental nonlinearities in intervention design. Subsidies exhibit threshold effects near critical boundaries; communication strategies must target dominant cognitive frameworks rather than disease severity, and early-stage campaigns possess outsized importance. This coupled dynamics approach extends naturally to other voluntary health behaviours where individual rationality conflicts with collective welfare.

Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological SciencesVol. 293(2083)
National Taiwan University (TW), Lehigh University (US)
Good health and well-being
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
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