Manipulation without Lies: AI Hyperpersuasion and the Limits of the Deception Paradigm

Abstract Large language models can now outperform human persuaders in controlled settings, and they do so in whichever direction they are instructed to persuade. Regulatory and ethical responses to this development nevertheless remain anchored in what this article calls the deception paradigm: the assumption that communicative influence becomes wrongful when, and because, it involves false assertion. The article argues that this paradigm systematically fails to capture AI hyperpersuasion. Drawing on the philosophical literature on manipulation, it shows that hyperpersuasion characteristically operates through true but selectively curated content, adaptive framing, simulated intimacy, and the exploitation of individually diagnosed cognitive dispositions – techniques that bypass rather than deceive rational agency. It then examines Article 5(1)(a)–(b) of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act. Although the prohibition is conceptually open to manipulation without deception, its operative test – material distortion, appreciable impairment of informed decision-making, counterfactual decision change, and significant harm – is inherited from unfair commercial practices law and reproduces the architecture of fraud, leaving paradigmatic cases of hyperpersuasion untouched. Extending the analysis from individual autonomy to democratic epistemology, the article contends that hyperpersuasion threatens democracy not primarily by aggregating individual harms but by degrading the epistemic conditions – independence of judgment formation, a shared space of reasons, and the contestability of public claims – on which collective self-government depends. Regulating hyperpersuasion therefore requires a shift from content-based tests of falsity and harm to process- and relationship-based criteria that target asymmetric epistemic power.

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Publication Details

Journal
Philosophy & Technology
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-026-01245-8
Primary Topic
Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
Type
article
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article

Manipulation without Lies: AI Hyperpersuasion and the Limits of the Deception Paradigm

Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann
5 links
Philosophy & Technology
Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
article

Manipulation without Lies: AI Hyperpersuasion and the Limits of the Deception Paradigm

Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann
article en

Abstract

Abstract Large language models can now outperform human persuaders in controlled settings, and they do so in whichever direction they are instructed to persuade. Regulatory and ethical responses to this development nevertheless remain anchored in what this article calls the deception paradigm: the assumption that communicative influence becomes wrongful when, and because, it involves false assertion. The article argues that this paradigm systematically fails to capture AI hyperpersuasion. Drawing on the philosophical literature on manipulation, it shows that hyperpersuasion characteristically operates through true but selectively curated content, adaptive framing, simulated intimacy, and the exploitation of individually diagnosed cognitive dispositions – techniques that bypass rather than deceive rational agency. It then examines Article 5(1)(a)–(b) of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act. Although the prohibition is conceptually open to manipulation without deception, its operative test – material distortion, appreciable impairment of informed decision-making, counterfactual decision change, and significant harm – is inherited from unfair commercial practices law and reproduces the architecture of fraud, leaving paradigmatic cases of hyperpersuasion untouched. Extending the analysis from individual autonomy to democratic epistemology, the article contends that hyperpersuasion threatens democracy not primarily by aggregating individual harms but by degrading the epistemic conditions – independence of judgment formation, a shared space of reasons, and the contestability of public claims – on which collective self-government depends. Regulating hyperpersuasion therefore requires a shift from content-based tests of falsity and harm to process- and relationship-based criteria that target asymmetric epistemic power.

Philosophy & TechnologyVol. 39(4)
London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
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