Central Bank Digital Currency, Deposit Substitution and Bank Net Interest Margins - A Theoretical Scenario Analysis with Monetary Policy Sensitivity

Abstract This paper examines how the monetary policy environment conditions the banking cost of retail central bank digital currency (CBDC). Using a theory-driven, no-sampling, scenario-based analytical framework, we evaluate four stylized CBDC policy configurations across three monetary policy rate environments representing low-rate, baseline, and elevated funding cost conditions. The central finding is that the net interest margin compression caused by CBDC-induced deposit substitution is not determined by CBDC design alone. It depends materially on the cost of alternative bank funding, and this dependence is amplified by the quantity of CBDC in circulation. The interaction is multiplicative, permissive CBDC design and elevated funding costs are complements in generating margin pressure, not independent risks. This implies that optimal CBDC holding limits are not rateenvironment-neutral, and that design rules calibrated under low-rate conditions may be systematically too permissive during monetary policy tightening cycles. JEL codes: E42, E58, G21, G28, E52, O33

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Competitio
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.21845/comp/2026/1-2/11
Primary Topic
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
article

Central Bank Digital Currency, Deposit Substitution and Bank Net Interest Margins - A Theoretical Scenario Analysis with Monetary Policy Sensitivity

Gyüre Ferenc
2 links
Competitio
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
article

Central Bank Digital Currency, Deposit Substitution and Bank Net Interest Margins - A Theoretical Scenario Analysis with Monetary Policy Sensitivity

Gyüre Ferenc
article en

Abstract

Abstract This paper examines how the monetary policy environment conditions the banking cost of retail central bank digital currency (CBDC). Using a theory-driven, no-sampling, scenario-based analytical framework, we evaluate four stylized CBDC policy configurations across three monetary policy rate environments representing low-rate, baseline, and elevated funding cost conditions. The central finding is that the net interest margin compression caused by CBDC-induced deposit substitution is not determined by CBDC design alone. It depends materially on the cost of alternative bank funding, and this dependence is amplified by the quantity of CBDC in circulation. The interaction is multiplicative, permissive CBDC design and elevated funding costs are complements in generating margin pressure, not independent risks. This implies that optimal CBDC holding limits are not rateenvironment-neutral, and that design rules calibrated under low-rate conditions may be systematically too permissive during monetary policy tightening cycles. JEL codes: E42, E58, G21, G28, E52, O33

CompetitioVol. 25(1-2)
University of Debrecen (HU)
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Laika access coming soon