Will, Information, and Autonomy: A Philosophical Reading of the Physicalist Dualism of the Will (PDW)
This article develops a philosophical reading of the Physicalist Dualism of the Will (PDW), as formulated in the work The Will as an Informational Field: A Physicalist Formulation of Consciousness [1]. According to the interpretation defended here, the will is a physical reality whose nature and causal efficacy are not exhausted by the description of brain activity, although its genesis and human manifestation involve cerebral organization. Consciousness is conceived as a physical-informational organization of experience, and the will as its guiding aspect in the selection, maintenance, and revision of actions. Through conceptual analysis, the distinctions between origin and identity, dependence and reduction, causal efficacy and passive accompaniment are examined. The electromagnetic analogy is discussed as a heuristic resource for thinking about dynamic autonomy, without being taken as a demonstration of the hypothesis. The essay situates the PDW in dialogue with Chalmers, Penrose and Hameroff, Eccles, Bohm, and Whitehead, distinguishing affinities and differences. It is argued that the rejection of extra-physical interventions does not require identifying all conscious causality with neural activity. The irreducibility of the will remains, however, a hypothesis whose defense requires addressing the objections of causal exclusion and cerebral dependence, without confusing its philosophical formulation with empirical confirmation.
Authors
- Alexandre César Dourado Neves (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0534-4481)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-16
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24288327
- Primary Topic
- Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Type
- preprint