Stock Lending and Pass-Through Voting

Concerns about conflicts of interest have led to growing calls for asset managers to let fund investors cast votes directly at shareholder meetings. We study this reform, known as pass-through voting, in a model where market participants with heterogeneous preferences lend shares, trade, and vote. We show that it can move voting outcomes further away from investors' preferences, rather than closer, for a reason that has received little attention: the fund's manager retains control over share lending and may lend more once the votes are no longer his to cast. Because the votes attached to lent shares end up in the hands of traders whose preferences differ from those of the fund's investors, pass-through voting can leave these investors worse off, even after accounting for lending revenue. The manager, meanwhile, may embrace the reform to increase lending income. Our analyses inform the debate over mandating pass-through voting, the use of lending fees as a proxy for the value of a vote, and, more broadly, policy at the intersection of shareholder voting and securities lending.

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Publication Details

Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-fin-1170-2026
Primary Topic
Corporate Finance and Governance
Type
preprint
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preprint

Stock Lending and Pass-Through Voting

Doron Levit, George Nurisso
2 links
Corporate Finance and Governance
preprint

Stock Lending and Pass-Through Voting

Doron Levit, George Nurisso
preprint en

Abstract

Concerns about conflicts of interest have led to growing calls for asset managers to let fund investors cast votes directly at shareholder meetings. We study this reform, known as pass-through voting, in a model where market participants with heterogeneous preferences lend shares, trade, and vote. We show that it can move voting outcomes further away from investors' preferences, rather than closer, for a reason that has received little attention: the fund's manager retains control over share lending and may lend more once the votes are no longer his to cast. Because the votes attached to lent shares end up in the hands of traders whose preferences differ from those of the fund's investors, pass-through voting can leave these investors worse off, even after accounting for lending revenue. The manager, meanwhile, may embrace the reform to increase lending income. Our analyses inform the debate over mandating pass-through voting, the use of lending fees as a proxy for the value of a vote, and, more broadly, policy at the intersection of shareholder voting and securities lending.

University of Washington (US), University of Florida (US), European Corporate Governance Institute (BE)
Corporate Finance and Governance
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