Payoff-Based Certificates for Convergence to Pure Nash Equilibria under Replicator Dynamics

For finite bimatrix games, we give a payoff-based sufficient condition $E>0$ for an interior initial state to converge to a specified strict pure Nash equilibrium under replicator dynamics. The construction combines lower bounds on the growth rates of log probability ratios between target and alternative actions with a first integral of a two-dimensional comparison system. It allows one player's payoff advantage to compensate for the other's disadvantage, certifying convergence even when a target action initially loses probability. For rational inputs and integration base points with algebraic exponentials, we give a finite exact test. We obtain closed-form box probabilities and, when all nontarget actions are included, closed-form upper bounds on convergence time. In two-action coordination games, choosing the base points at the sign thresholds recovers the full basin of attraction. Experiments on random games show that basin coverage shrinks rapidly with the number of actions. For $n=4,5,6$, median entry times are approximately 70% of median box-entry times without shifts and 40% for a union over 16 shift choices. Extensions cover multiplayer games through cooperative comparison systems and explicit boxes, and discrete-time exponential-weights learning under explicit step-size conditions.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.20407
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Applications
Type
preprint
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preprint

Payoff-Based Certificates for Convergence to Pure Nash Equilibria under Replicator Dynamics

Daisuke Hirota
arXiv (Cornell University)
Game Theory and Applications
preprint

Payoff-Based Certificates for Convergence to Pure Nash Equilibria under Replicator Dynamics

Daisuke Hirota
preprint en

Abstract

For finite bimatrix games, we give a payoff-based sufficient condition $E>0$ for an interior initial state to converge to a specified strict pure Nash equilibrium under replicator dynamics. The construction combines lower bounds on the growth rates of log probability ratios between target and alternative actions with a first integral of a two-dimensional comparison system. It allows one player's payoff advantage to compensate for the other's disadvantage, certifying convergence even when a target action initially loses probability. For rational inputs and integration base points with algebraic exponentials, we give a finite exact test. We obtain closed-form box probabilities and, when all nontarget actions are included, closed-form upper bounds on convergence time. In two-action coordination games, choosing the base points at the sign thresholds recovers the full basin of attraction. Experiments on random games show that basin coverage shrinks rapidly with the number of actions. For $n=4,5,6$, median entry times are approximately 70% of median box-entry times without shifts and 40% for a union over 16 shift choices. Extensions cover multiplayer games through cooperative comparison systems and explicit boxes, and discrete-time exponential-weights learning under explicit step-size conditions.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Game Theory and Applications
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