Approximation and Error Bounds for Zero-Sum Stopping Games with Probability Criteria

This paper studies a two-person zero-sum stochastic game, which must terminate when either player quits the game or a state of the game first enters a prescribed target set. The performance criterion is the probability that the total reward reaches a given threshold. First, under a mild condition, we prove the existence of the value and a Nash equilibrium of the game by developing a comparison theorem. Second, for solving the game with infinite states, we develop a finite-state approximation method based on truncation, and derive explicit error bounds between the values of the truncated and original games. Third, using the error bounds, we design an effective algorithm, by which we can not only obtain any approximation of the value and Nash equilibria of the original game, but also provide convergence analysis of the approximation. Finally, a queueing example is used to illustrate the advantage of our condition and the effectiveness of our algorithm.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.20428
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Applications
Type
preprint
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preprint

Approximation and Error Bounds for Zero-Sum Stopping Games with Probability Criteria

Xin Guo, Zewu Zheng, Xin Wen, Xianping Guo
arXiv (Cornell University)
Game Theory and Applications
preprint

Approximation and Error Bounds for Zero-Sum Stopping Games with Probability Criteria

Xin Guo, Zewu Zheng, Xin Wen, Xianping Guo
preprint en

Abstract

This paper studies a two-person zero-sum stochastic game, which must terminate when either player quits the game or a state of the game first enters a prescribed target set. The performance criterion is the probability that the total reward reaches a given threshold. First, under a mild condition, we prove the existence of the value and a Nash equilibrium of the game by developing a comparison theorem. Second, for solving the game with infinite states, we develop a finite-state approximation method based on truncation, and derive explicit error bounds between the values of the truncated and original games. Third, using the error bounds, we design an effective algorithm, by which we can not only obtain any approximation of the value and Nash equilibria of the original game, but also provide convergence analysis of the approximation. Finally, a queueing example is used to illustrate the advantage of our condition and the effectiveness of our algorithm.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Game Theory and Applications
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