Fragile Efficiency: The 2026 Persian Gulf War and Hidden Concentration Risk in the Global Economy

Purpose – This paper asks whether globalisation made the world economy more efficient but also more fragile. It examines the Persian Gulf conflict that began on 28 February 2026 and the reported disruption of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz as a recent external-shock case study. The study traces plausible pathways through which concentrated supply chains can transmit disruptions; it does not claim causal identification from a natural experiment. Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses the banking concept of concentration risk as an analytical analogy to global value chains and traces five transmission chains of the 2026 shock: helium and semiconductors, sulfur and battery nickel, fertilizer and food security, cloud infrastructure and data, and marine insurance. Evidence is drawn from institutional reports (BIS, IEA, IFA, WFP, WEF), industry data and contemporaneous reporting between March and October 2026. Findings – The shock surfaced far from oil markets: in chip plants in East Asia, nickel refineries in Indonesia, farms in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, and cloud data centres. Four recurring patterns are suggested by the assembled cases, subject to differences in source reliability and the absence of a counterfactual. Concentration risk is hidden because it is off-balance-sheet, layered and transmitted through indirect channels; by-products of hydrocarbons such as helium and sulfur inherit the geographic concentration of oil and gas without being counted as energy risk; source diversity appears to have shaped exposure, although firm size and other confounders are not controlled for; and conventional short-horizon performance metrics may discourage some investments in resilience. Originality/value – The paper offers a unified, cross-sectoral reading of the 2026 Hormuz shock through the lens of concentration risk, formulates four propositions for future empirical testing, and translates them into practical tools for managers and policymakers, including multi-tier dependency mapping and the application of concentration indices to suppliers, routes, customers and data infrastructure.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24323628
Primary Topic
Supply Chain Resilience and Risk Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Fragile Efficiency: The 2026 Persian Gulf War and Hidden Concentration Risk in the Global Economy

Masoumeh Nika Kiani Kiani
3 links
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Supply Chain Resilience and Risk Management
article

Fragile Efficiency: The 2026 Persian Gulf War and Hidden Concentration Risk in the Global Economy

Masoumeh Nika Kiani Kiani
article en

Abstract

Purpose – This paper asks whether globalisation made the world economy more efficient but also more fragile. It examines the Persian Gulf conflict that began on 28 February 2026 and the reported disruption of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz as a recent external-shock case study. The study traces plausible pathways through which concentrated supply chains can transmit disruptions; it does not claim causal identification from a natural experiment. Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses the banking concept of concentration risk as an analytical analogy to global value chains and traces five transmission chains of the 2026 shock: helium and semiconductors, sulfur and battery nickel, fertilizer and food security, cloud infrastructure and data, and marine insurance. Evidence is drawn from institutional reports (BIS, IEA, IFA, WFP, WEF), industry data and contemporaneous reporting between March and October 2026. Findings – The shock surfaced far from oil markets: in chip plants in East Asia, nickel refineries in Indonesia, farms in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, and cloud data centres. Four recurring patterns are suggested by the assembled cases, subject to differences in source reliability and the absence of a counterfactual. Concentration risk is hidden because it is off-balance-sheet, layered and transmitted through indirect channels; by-products of hydrocarbons such as helium and sulfur inherit the geographic concentration of oil and gas without being counted as energy risk; source diversity appears to have shaped exposure, although firm size and other confounders are not controlled for; and conventional short-horizon performance metrics may discourage some investments in resilience. Originality/value – The paper offers a unified, cross-sectoral reading of the 2026 Hormuz shock through the lens of concentration risk, formulates four propositions for future empirical testing, and translates them into practical tools for managers and policymakers, including multi-tier dependency mapping and the application of concentration indices to suppliers, routes, customers and data infrastructure.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Supply Chain Resilience and Risk Management
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