Winning the prescription: competitive tenders versus decentralized competition

Abstract Payers increasingly use competitive tendering to reduce expenditures on patent‐protected pharmaceuticals. Using a duopoly model with horizontally differentiated drugs, we show that tendering can harm patients and fail to reduce costs. When demand depends on physicians' tolerance for treatment loss, tendering yields a mixed‐strategy equilibrium: firms balance bidding low to win the contract against bidding high to exploit residual demand. Compared with decentralized competition, tendering worsens patient outcomes and increases expected prices unless the treatment‐loss tolerance is sufficiently high. Quality asymmetries and captive segments further amplify these distortions, highlighting critical trade‐offs in procurement design.

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Publication Details

Journal
Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.70051
Primary Topic
Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Winning the prescription: competitive tenders versus decentralized competition

Kurt Richard Brekke, Odd Rune Straume, Dag Morten Dalen
1 links
Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy
article

Winning the prescription: competitive tenders versus decentralized competition

Kurt Richard Brekke, Odd Rune Straume, Dag Morten Dalen
article en

Abstract

Abstract Payers increasingly use competitive tendering to reduce expenditures on patent‐protected pharmaceuticals. Using a duopoly model with horizontally differentiated drugs, we show that tendering can harm patients and fail to reduce costs. When demand depends on physicians' tolerance for treatment loss, tendering yields a mixed‐strategy equilibrium: firms balance bidding low to win the contract against bidding high to exploit residual demand. Compared with decentralized competition, tendering worsens patient outcomes and increases expected prices unless the treatment‐loss tolerance is sufficiently high. Quality asymmetries and captive segments further amplify these distortions, highlighting critical trade‐offs in procurement design.

Scandinavian Journal of Economics
BI Norwegian Business School (NO), Norwegian School of Economics (NO), University of Minho (PT)
Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy
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