Winning the prescription: competitive tenders versus decentralized competition
Abstract Payers increasingly use competitive tendering to reduce expenditures on patent‐protected pharmaceuticals. Using a duopoly model with horizontally differentiated drugs, we show that tendering can harm patients and fail to reduce costs. When demand depends on physicians' tolerance for treatment loss, tendering yields a mixed‐strategy equilibrium: firms balance bidding low to win the contract against bidding high to exploit residual demand. Compared with decentralized competition, tendering worsens patient outcomes and increases expected prices unless the treatment‐loss tolerance is sufficiently high. Quality asymmetries and captive segments further amplify these distortions, highlighting critical trade‐offs in procurement design.
Authors
- Kurt Richard Brekke (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1461-6290)
- Odd Rune Straume (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6889-2717)
- Dag Morten Dalen (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7410-8442)
Institutions
- BI Norwegian Business School (NO)
- Norwegian School of Economics (NO)
- University of Minho (PT)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Published
- 2026-11-17
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.70051
- Primary Topic
- Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia