Configuration integrity and technical acceptance in avionics protection

Abstract Objective: How can the authenticity of a digital load be distinguished from its safe applicability to a platform? Method: purposive documentary synthesis and dependency analysis from a military intelligence perspective, comparing public technical and institutional references. Evidence, inference and exercise assumptions are distinguished. Results: the study proposes a justification chain, defensive architecture and response flowchart, together with observables for future evaluation. Cryptographic authenticity should be complemented by approved configuration and airworthiness authority. The contribution links observed capability, competent authority and risk acceptance. No experimental measurements were obtained and operational effectiveness was not estimated. Interoperability references and NIST frameworks are applied within their scope and do not constitute certification. Conclusion: An authentic load is not necessarily an acceptable load. Avionics protection requires applicability traceability, tested segregation and authorised release, with flight safety taking priority. The model requires external review and authorised testing before adoption.

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Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24305199
Primary Topic
Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Configuration integrity and technical acceptance in avionics protection

ANDRES SALAVERRIA GALVAN
3 links
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
article

Configuration integrity and technical acceptance in avionics protection

ANDRES SALAVERRIA GALVAN
article en

Abstract

Abstract Objective: How can the authenticity of a digital load be distinguished from its safe applicability to a platform? Method: purposive documentary synthesis and dependency analysis from a military intelligence perspective, comparing public technical and institutional references. Evidence, inference and exercise assumptions are distinguished. Results: the study proposes a justification chain, defensive architecture and response flowchart, together with observables for future evaluation. Cryptographic authenticity should be complemented by approved configuration and airworthiness authority. The contribution links observed capability, competent authority and risk acceptance. No experimental measurements were obtained and operational effectiveness was not estimated. Interoperability references and NIST frameworks are applied within their scope and do not constitute certification. Conclusion: An authentic load is not necessarily an acceptable load. Avionics protection requires applicability traceability, tested segregation and authorised release, with flight safety taking priority. The model requires external review and authorised testing before adoption.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
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