Reforming tropical forest finance to unlock large-scale cooperation

This is a pre-print of an article submitted to peer-review. Abstract We combine a calibrated model of jurisdictional forest-conservation rewards with a voluntary-contribution game to study reforms to the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF). At a donor cost of US\$1 billion yr⁻¹, direct funding, a uniform marginal reward and a budget-dependent reference level raise avoided emissions from about 9 to 40 MtCO₂ yr⁻¹. Using a global social cost of carbon of US$210 tCO₂⁻¹, the optimized mechanism implies an EU contribution of US\$0.8 billion yr⁻¹ and an EU–China coalition contribution of US\$6.7 billion yr⁻¹ purely based on self-interest. A binding 25% third-party match raises total funding to US\$13.1 billion yr⁻¹ and avoided emissions from 141 to 220 MtCO₂ yr⁻¹. Our results show how efficient reward design and conditional commitments can reinforce each other to mobilize international climate finance and deliver additional mitigation.

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Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24292633
Primary Topic
Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
Type
preprint
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preprint

Reforming tropical forest finance to unlock large-scale cooperation

Sabine Fuss, Ottmar Edenhofer, Matthias Kalkuhl, Lennart Stern et al.
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
preprint

Reforming tropical forest finance to unlock large-scale cooperation

Sabine Fuss, Ottmar Edenhofer, Matthias Kalkuhl, Lennart Stern, Sreoshi Banerjee
preprint en

Abstract

This is a pre-print of an article submitted to peer-review. Abstract We combine a calibrated model of jurisdictional forest-conservation rewards with a voluntary-contribution game to study reforms to the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF). At a donor cost of US\$1 billion yr⁻¹, direct funding, a uniform marginal reward and a budget-dependent reference level raise avoided emissions from about 9 to 40 MtCO₂ yr⁻¹. Using a global social cost of carbon of US$210 tCO₂⁻¹, the optimized mechanism implies an EU contribution of US\$0.8 billion yr⁻¹ and an EU–China coalition contribution of US\$6.7 billion yr⁻¹ purely based on self-interest. A binding 25% third-party match raises total funding to US\$13.1 billion yr⁻¹ and avoided emissions from 141 to 220 MtCO₂ yr⁻¹. Our results show how efficient reward design and conditional commitments can reinforce each other to mobilize international climate finance and deliver additional mitigation.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (DE), Technische Universität Berlin (DE), Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (DE)
Climate action, Partnerships for the goals, Life on land, Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
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