Reforming tropical forest finance to unlock large-scale cooperation
This is a pre-print of an article submitted to peer-review. Abstract We combine a calibrated model of jurisdictional forest-conservation rewards with a voluntary-contribution game to study reforms to the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF). At a donor cost of US\$1 billion yr⁻¹, direct funding, a uniform marginal reward and a budget-dependent reference level raise avoided emissions from about 9 to 40 MtCO₂ yr⁻¹. Using a global social cost of carbon of US$210 tCO₂⁻¹, the optimized mechanism implies an EU contribution of US\$0.8 billion yr⁻¹ and an EU–China coalition contribution of US\$6.7 billion yr⁻¹ purely based on self-interest. A binding 25% third-party match raises total funding to US\$13.1 billion yr⁻¹ and avoided emissions from 141 to 220 MtCO₂ yr⁻¹. Our results show how efficient reward design and conditional commitments can reinforce each other to mobilize international climate finance and deliver additional mitigation.
Authors
- Sabine Fuss (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8681-9839)
- Ottmar Edenhofer (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6029-5208)
- Matthias Kalkuhl (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4797-6628)
- Lennart Stern
- Sreoshi Banerjee (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2903-2121)
Institutions
- Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (DE)
- Technische Universität Berlin (DE)
- Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (DE)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-17
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24292633
- Primary Topic
- Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
- Type
- preprint