From the Ballot Box to City Hall: The Displacement of Criminal Violence in Mexican Municipal Politics

Abstract A significant part of the literature on Mexico holds that criminal violence filters local competition: it intimidates aspiring candidates and thins the field of contenders. Yet in 2024, in the most violent election of the country’s recent history, municipal ballots reached election day full. This article seeks to explain that paradox. It argues that organized crime did not withdraw from municipal politics but changed arenas, from contesting elections to constraining those who govern. Drawing on a panel of 13,035 regular municipal elections held between 2006 and 2024 and a harmonized, event-level series of violence against mayors, I estimate fixed-effects models that compare violence before and after the registration of candidacies. Lethal violence does not reduce electoral supply, and attacks on sitting authorities trim it by about 5%. Since 2019, killings of mayors are no longer concentrated in the pre-electoral year, and mayors from the governor’s party suffer fewer attacks than their opponents. Criminal violence now contests government more than it contests elections. Policies that concentrate protection on candidates and on the electoral calendar therefore address the least decisive arena of criminal governance.

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Publication Details

Journal
Research Square
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11733380/v1
Primary Topic
Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
Type
preprint
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preprint

From the Ballot Box to City Hall: The Displacement of Criminal Violence in Mexican Municipal Politics

Said Hernández Quintana
1 links
Research Square
Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
preprint

From the Ballot Box to City Hall: The Displacement of Criminal Violence in Mexican Municipal Politics

Said Hernández Quintana
preprint en

Abstract

Abstract A significant part of the literature on Mexico holds that criminal violence filters local competition: it intimidates aspiring candidates and thins the field of contenders. Yet in 2024, in the most violent election of the country’s recent history, municipal ballots reached election day full. This article seeks to explain that paradox. It argues that organized crime did not withdraw from municipal politics but changed arenas, from contesting elections to constraining those who govern. Drawing on a panel of 13,035 regular municipal elections held between 2006 and 2024 and a harmonized, event-level series of violence against mayors, I estimate fixed-effects models that compare violence before and after the registration of candidacies. Lethal violence does not reduce electoral supply, and attacks on sitting authorities trim it by about 5%. Since 2019, killings of mayors are no longer concentrated in the pre-electoral year, and mayors from the governor’s party suffer fewer attacks than their opponents. Criminal violence now contests government more than it contests elections. Policies that concentrate protection on candidates and on the electoral calendar therefore address the least decisive arena of criminal governance.

Research Square
Universidad Iberoamericana (MX)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
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