Analysis of the Current Development Status, Causes, Dilemmas, and Governance Paths of Price Wars in the New Energy Vehicle Industry

China's new energy vehicle (NEV) industry, after rapid expansion, is confronted with the predicament of growing output alongside squeezed profits. Its industrial profit margin dropped to 4.1% in 2025, a ten-year low, while vehicle manufacturing margins shrank to 1.5% in H1 2026. Price cuts launched by leading enterprises set off a chain reaction, trapping the sector in a prisoner's dilemma. This paper reviews NEV price competition and identifies its regional, continuous, transmissive and multi-dimensional evolutionary features. Drawing on the prisoner's dilemma game model and the "policy-technology-market" triple lock-in mechanism, it argues that the price war arises from firm gaming and institutional lock-in rather than supply-demand imbalance. A three-stage governance framework is put forward: short-term market regulation, medium-term unlocking of development paths, and long-term shift toward value-based competition. The study concludes that the industry can escape the price competition trap only by replacing price competition with value competition, supported by technological innovation, institutional improvement and global layout.

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Publication Details

Journal
Advances in Economics Management and Political Sciences
Published
2026-11-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.54254/2754-1169/2026.bh39196
Primary Topic
Merger and Competition Analysis
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Analysis of the Current Development Status, Causes, Dilemmas, and Governance Paths of Price Wars in the New Energy Vehicle Industry

Peihang Zhong
3 links
Advances in Economics Management and Political Sciences
Merger and Competition Analysis
article

Analysis of the Current Development Status, Causes, Dilemmas, and Governance Paths of Price Wars in the New Energy Vehicle Industry

Peihang Zhong
article en

Abstract

China's new energy vehicle (NEV) industry, after rapid expansion, is confronted with the predicament of growing output alongside squeezed profits. Its industrial profit margin dropped to 4.1% in 2025, a ten-year low, while vehicle manufacturing margins shrank to 1.5% in H1 2026. Price cuts launched by leading enterprises set off a chain reaction, trapping the sector in a prisoner's dilemma. This paper reviews NEV price competition and identifies its regional, continuous, transmissive and multi-dimensional evolutionary features. Drawing on the prisoner's dilemma game model and the "policy-technology-market" triple lock-in mechanism, it argues that the price war arises from firm gaming and institutional lock-in rather than supply-demand imbalance. A three-stage governance framework is put forward: short-term market regulation, medium-term unlocking of development paths, and long-term shift toward value-based competition. The study concludes that the industry can escape the price competition trap only by replacing price competition with value competition, supported by technological innovation, institutional improvement and global layout.

Advances in Economics Management and Political SciencesVol. 311(1)
Tianjin University of Finance and Economics (CN)
Merger and Competition Analysis
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