Incentive Structure Shapes Mitigation Behavior in a Dynamic Landslide Risk Simulator
Decisions regarding mitigation and adaptation in terms of money in areas prone to landslides need to be made repeatedly. But, there is no evidence of how incentive structures of disaster insurance affect the mitigation process in dynamic environments of hazard. In the present study, mitigation and insurance decisions were studied using the Interactive Landslide Simulator, a microworld of Human Factors involving repeated decision-making under landslide risk. Seventy-five participants hailing from landslide-prone areas of Himachal Pradesh, India, were randomly allocated into No Insurance, Benevolent Insurance, or Smart Insurance groups and asked to perform 36 rounds of decision-making. It was found that insurance structure affected both mitigation and insurance investments. While the highest level of mitigation was observed in case of no insurance, Smart Insurance resulted in maximum insurance investment but did not enhance mitigation over Benevolent Insurance. Findings suggest that reimbursement-system design can shape risk-management behavior in disaster-risk policy.
Authors
- Kala Venkata Uday (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9579-5496)
- Varun Dutt (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2151-8314)
- Palvi Aggarwal (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2488-8959)
- Ankush (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0006-9575-4148)
Institutions
- The University of Texas at El Paso (US)
- Indian Institute of Technology Mandi (IN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting
- Published
- 2026-11-17
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1177/10711813261498786
- Primary Topic
- Disaster Management and Resilience
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00